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Informed Trading around Biotech M&As 







We compare the PIN estimates using the Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002) and Yan 
and Zhang (2012) estimation methods over the takeover announcement life cycle based on 
intraday data for 54 U.S. biotech acquirers and 95 U.S. biotech targets between 2005 and 
2011. We find that: (1) the Yan and Zhang method is subject to (generally not significantly) 
less downward bias; (2) the estimates for the Easley et al. method increase significantly as 
the number of observations used in their estimation increases; and (3) firm characteristics 
such as book-to-market ratio, financial leverage, firm size, insider holdings, institutional 
holdings, and research and development expenses are determinants of the PIN estimates. 
Consistent with the previous literature, the cumulative abnormal returns around 
announcement dates are more significant for targets than acquirers and are strongly 

















I am deeply grateful to my supervisor Dr. Lawrence Kryzanowski for his kindness, 
encouragement, insightful comments, and immense knowledge. His generous support and 
guidance motivated me in all the time of research and writing of this thesis and his kindness 
sharpened my life attitude for my future adventures.  
My sincere appreciation to Dr. Rahul Ravi for his data collection support and his 
enjoyable teaching. 
Special thanks to my colleague Osman Ulas Aktas for his warm encouragement and 
sharing.  
I owe my deepest gratitude to my family: my parents Trần Văn Thắng and Nguyễn 
Thiện Nữ Hai for giving me everything and supporting me endlessly, my lovely grandmas, 



















TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF TABLES ..........................................................................................................viii 
1. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................1 
2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON BIOTECH M&As AND MEASURES OF 
THE PROBABILITY OF INFORMATION-BASED TRADING ......................................3 
2.1 Mergers and Acquisitions Involving Biotech Firms .................................................3 
2.2 Easley et al. PIN Method ..........................................................................................4 
2.3 Yan and Zhang PIN Specification ............................................................................7 
3. SAMPLE AND DATA .............................................................................................8 
4. PIN ESTIMATES FOR ACQUIRERS AND TARGETS USING THE EASLEY 
ET AL. MODEL ................................................................................................................11 
4.1 EHO PIN Estimates for the Acquirers ....................................................................12 
4.2 EHO PIN Estimates for the Targets ........................................................................13 
5. PIN ESTIMATES FOR ACQUIRERS AND TARGETS USING THE YAN AND 
ZHANG ESTIMATION METHOD ..................................................................................14 
5.1 YZ PIN Estimates for the Acquirers .......................................................................14 
5.2 YZ PIN Estimates for the Targets ...........................................................................15 
6. COMPARISON OF THE PIN ESTIMATES BETWEEN ACQUIRERS AND 
TARGETS FOR EACH ESTIMATION MODEL ............................................................16 
6.1 Comparison of the EHO PIN Estimates for Acquirers and Targets .......................16 
6.2 Comparison of the YZ PIN Estimates for Acquirers and Targets ..........................17 
7. COMPARISON OF THE TWO PIN ESTIMATES FOR ACQUIRERS AND FOR 
TARGETS..........................................................................................................................17 
7.1 Comparison of PIN Estimates between the Two Estimation Methods for 
Acquirers ............................................................................................................................18 
7.2 Comparison of PIN Estimates between the Two Estimation Methods for Targets 18 
vi 
 
8. TESTS OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE EHO PIN ESTIMATES TO THE 
WITHIN-DAY NUMBER OF SAMPLES FOR THE AD AND ED WINDOWS...........19 
8.1 PIN Estimate Sensitivity to Number of Observations for the AD and ED for 
Acquirers ............................................................................................................................19 
8.2 PIN Estimate Sensitivity to Number of Observations for the AD and ED for 
Targets................................................................................................................................20 
9. TESTS FOR INFORMATION LEAKAGE ...........................................................20 
9.1 Relevant Literature..................................................................................................21 
9.2 Hypotheses on the Changes of CARs Before and Around ADs for Acquirers and 
Targets................................................................................................................................24 
9.3 Empirical Results on the CARs Before and Around ADs for Acquirers and 
Targets................................................................................................................................24 
9.3.1 Examination of the Changes of CARs for Acquirers and Targets Before and 
Around ADs ............................................................................................................... 24 
9.3.2 Empirical Results on the Determinants of CARs around ADs for Acquirers 
and Targets ................................................................................................................ 25 
10. DETERMINANTS OF THE PROBABILITY OF INFORMATION-BASED 
TRADING..........................................................................................................................29 
10.1 Relevant Literature..................................................................................................29 
10.2 Methodology and Empirical Results on Determinants of PINs for Acquirers and 
Targets................................................................................................................................30 
11. CONCLUSIONS.....................................................................................................33 
APPENDIX A ....................................................................................................................34 







LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1: Summary statistics for the sample of acquirers and targets .................................37 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the PIN estimates using the Easley et al. method for 
acquirers .............................................................................................................................38 
Table 3: Tests of differences in EHO PIN estimates for acquirers between the five 
acquisition windows...........................................................................................................39 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for the PIN estimates using the Easley et al. method for 
targets .................................................................................................................................40 
Table 5: Tests of differences in EHO PIN estimates for targets between the three 
acquisition windows...........................................................................................................41 
Table 6: Descriptive statistics for the PIN estimates using the Yan and Zhang method for 
acquirers .............................................................................................................................42 
Table 7: Tests of differences in YZ PIN estimates for acquirers between the five 
acquisition windows...........................................................................................................43 
Table 8: Descriptive statistics for the PIN estimates using the Yan and Zhang method for 
targets .................................................................................................................................44 
Table 9: Tests of differences in YZ PIN estimates for targets between the three 
acquisition windows...........................................................................................................45 
Table 10: Tests of differences in EHO PIN estimates between acquirers and targets for 
the three acquisition windows ............................................................................................46 
Table 11: Tests of differences in YZ PIN estimates between acquirers and targets for the 
three acquisition windows..................................................................................................47 
Table 12: Tests of differences between the EHO PIN estimates and YZ PIN estimates for 
acquirers .............................................................................................................................48 
Table 13: Tests of differences between the EHO PIN estimates and YZ PIN estimates for 
targets .................................................................................................................................49 
Table 14: Tests of differences in EHO PIN estimates for acquirers between the 13, 26, 
and 39 samples for the second window .............................................................................50 
viii 
 
Table 15: Tests of differences in EHO PIN estimates for acquirers between the 13, 26, 
and 39 samples for the fourth window ...............................................................................51 
Table 16: Tests of differences in EHO PIN estimates for targets between the 13, 26, and 
39 samples for the second window ....................................................................................52 
Table 17: Pre-bid acquisition gains for acquirer and target U.S. biotech firms from 2005 
to 2011 ...............................................................................................................................53 
Table 18: Changes in pre-bid acquisition gains from the 60 days before ADs to 3 days 
around ADs periods for acquirer and target U.S. biotech firms from 2005 to 2011 .........54 
Table 19: Regression of the mean CARs for the [AD-1, AD+1] window on the firm 
characteristics for acquirers ...............................................................................................55 
Table 20: Regression of means CARs over the [AD-1, AD+1] window on firm 
characteristics for targets ...................................................................................................56 
Table 21: Cross-sectional regression results for firm characteristics variables on the YZ 
PINs and EMO PINs around ADs for acquirers ................................................................57 
Table 22: Cross-sectional regression results for firm characteristics variables on the YZ 
PINs and EMO PINs around ADs for targets ....................................................................58 
1 
 
INFORMED TRADING AROUND BIOTECH M&As 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The probability of information-based trading or PIN estimation introduced by Easley et 
al. (2002, 2010) or EHO PIN has been frequently employed in market microstructure, asset 
pricing, and corporate finance research. There is evidence for and against the application 
of the estimates. Criticisms about the accuracy of the measure center on two topics: the 
adverse effect of trade misclassifications on PIN estimates and PIN is a proxy of liquidity 
and not informed trading. Lin and Ke (2011) and Yan and Zhang (2012) present evidence 
documenting a downward bias for the measure that is due to the floating point exception 
phenomenon, and provide solutions to remedy the bias. Yan and Zhang (2012) introduce a 
new PIN estimation method by combining their new algorithm with the reformulated 
function of Lin and Ke (2011).  
In the first section of the thesis, we compare the EHO PIN and YZ PIN estimates for 
U.S. biotech M&As from 2005 to 2011. Firstly, we find that both types of estimates change 
significantly over the takeover announcement life cycle for both acquirers and targets, and 
become significant over the three days centered on the announcement dates or ADs for 
both acquirers and targets and effective dates or EDs for acquirers only. Secondly, both 
types of estimates for acquirers are consistently lower than those for targets throughout an 
acquisition life cycle. Thirdly, we find that YZ PIN estimates are (generally not 
significantly) higher than EHO PIN estimates over a three-day AD for both acquirers and 
targets, and three-day ED for acquirers. Our empirical findings provide weak support for 
the conjecture that the YZ PIN estimation method produces estimates with lower 
downward biases. 
Additionally, we address the sensitivity of the EHO PIN estimates to the number of 
observations in our sample and provide alternative sampling methods that help to estimate 
within-day PIN for short observation windows in M&As studies. We find that EHO PIN 
estimates increase significantly as the number of observations used in their estimation 
increases for acquirers over the three days centered on both the ADs and EDs, and for 
targets over the three days centered on the ADs. 
In the second section, we test the information leakage around ADs for both acquirers 
and targets by examining the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) based on the Carhart 
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four-factor model (1997). We find that the CARs over the pre-ADs and ADs periods are 
significant (insignificant) for targets (acquirers) and that the CARs over the pre-ADs 
increase significantly (remain unchanged) from the pre-ADs period for targets (acquirers). 
For both acquirers and targets, we estimate the cross-sectional regressions of the means of 
the CARs over the three-day ADs on potential independent variables and find that firm size 
positively (negatively) affects the CARs for acquirers (targets) and that book-to-market 
ratios only positively affect the performance of the CARs for targets. 
In the final section, we estimate the cross-sectional regressions of the means of both 
types of PIN estimates for the three-day ADs on potential independent variables. We find 
that acquirers with value stocks, higher insider holdings, and/or higher financial leverages 
are associated more with PINs.  We also confirm that targets with lower firm sizes, lower 
R&D expenses, and/or higher institutional holdings are associated more with PINs. 
Our research paper contributes to the literature on the estimation of PIN by examining 
the bias of the conventional estimation method introduced by Easley et al. (2002, 2010) by 
providing further evidence that the new estimation proposed by Yan and Zhang (2012) is 
(generally not significantly) less downward biased. Our research contributes to the 
literature on the existence of the leakage of information by examining CARs before and 
around takeover announcements and identifies links between the CARs and firm 
characteristics. Additionally, our examination of PIN determinants supports previous 
studies that identify specific firm characteristics as being associated with PIN. 
The thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on biotech M&As 
and the measures of PIN introduced by Easley et al. (2002) and Yan and Zhang (2012). 
Section 3 describes our sample and data. Section 4 and 5 present our EHO PINs and YZ 
PIN for acquirers and targets samples. Section 6 compares the PIN estimates between 
acquirers and targets.  Section 7 compares the EHO PINs and YZ PINs for acquirers versus 
targets. Section 8 tests the sensitivity of the EHO PIN estimates to the within-day number 
of observations. Section 9 presents the tests for information leakage and its relation with 
firm characteristics. Section 10 presents the tests for the determinants of PINs. Section XI 
concludes the thesis. 
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2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON BIOTECH M&As AND 
MEASURES OF THE PROBABILITY OF INFORMATION-BASED TRADING 
2.1 Mergers and Acquisitions Involving Biotech Firms 
 Some studies find that stock market valuations are positive only for high-tech acquirers 
that acquire high-tech targets (Anand and Singh, 1997; Hitt et al., 2001; Danzon, Epstein 
and Nicholson, 2004; Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006; Kallunki, Pyykko, and Laamanen, 
2009). Higgins and Rodriguez (2006) note that biotechnology firms have a strong 
dependence on investment and the productivity of their research and development (R&D). 
Since R&D is strongly associated with information asymmetries due to the uncertainty of 
R&D successes and confidentiality, the lack of publicly available information about a 
firm’s R&D should lead to a high probability of informed trading.  
 Lahteenmaki and Lawrence (2006) find that research partnerships between biotech 
companies increased from 27 to 58 percent from 1995 to 2005. Surveys in 2005 from 
Nature Biotechnology for 404 public companies and Ernst & Young for 671 companies 
report that the total net losses of public biotechnology firms of all sizes declined, 
meanwhile revenues grew at a rapid pace of about one-fifth from 2004 to 2005 in which 
large caps contributed two-thirds of total revenues. Mid-caps, small-caps, and micro caps 
also experienced increases in revenues during the period.  
 Aggarwal, Gupta and Bagchi-Sen (2006) study the patenting trend in the U.S. public 
biotech sector. They find that the trend increased continuously from 1995 to 2003, with a 
drop between 2004 and 2005. Small biotech companies face financial constraints due to 
high R&D costs, rapidly changing environments, and high competition. Medium-sized 
biotech companies exhibit a consistent but low rise in patenting over the ten-year period 
from 1993. Medium-sized companies invest more in producing generics, contract services, 
and software businesses. In their 2003 survey, 19 large-sized biotech companies have 
revenues over $500 million. The top 5 companies (Amgen, Monsanto, Genentech, Biogen 
Idec, and Chiron) own 699, 3763, 983, 183, and 834 total patents, respectively, over the 
period from 1976 to 2005. Moreover, there are more than 70 mid-sized biotech companies, 
whose revenues are between $50 and $500 million, which have lower but more stable 
patenting rate than large-sized biotech companies. These mid-sized companies focus 
strongly on R&D, generics, contract services, and software businesses. The top 5 mid-sized 
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biotech companies (Millennium Pharmaceuticals, Genencor, Affymetrix, Sepracor, Symex 
Techonologies) own 424, 320, 275, 262, and 220 patents, respectively, from 1976 to 
2005.With the consistent rise in patenting for biotech companies of all sizes, mergers 
mostly performed by small-sized firms and acquisitions mostly performed by large-sized 
firms due to the need for financial assistance of small firms and of building patent portfolios 
of larger firms. 
2.2 Easley et al. PIN Method  
 In the microstructure literature, the estimation of the probability of informed trading 
introduced by Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara (2002, 2010) or EHO PIN is widely used along 
with other measures such as the bid-ask spread, volume, trading liquidity, and duration to 
analyze how information is incorporated into stock values (Nyholm, 2002). Some authors 
call for caution when using this method in empirical studies due to evidence showing that 
EHO PIN estimates contradict some fundamental theories. Boehmer, Grammig, and 
Theissen (2007) state that EHO PIN estimation used observable information on buyer- and 
seller-initiated trades to infer the unobservable probability of informed trading. Based on a 
comparison of the EHO PIN estimates obtained by applying the Lee-Ready algorithm to 
classify trades with unbiased EHO PIN estimates for a sample of stocks from the NYSE, 
they find that the first EHO PIN estimates are underestimated by 18 percent. They 
recommend that their adjustment procedure should be used to mitigate the downward bias 
of the estimates which is caused by trade misclassifications.  
 Duarte and Young (2009) argue that the EHO PIN estimation method implies a negative 
correlation between buys and sells due to positive and negative private information, 
respectively. However, they find a strong positive correlation between buys and sells in 
their sample which is inconsistent with the implicit negative covariance in the EHO PIN 
model. They construct an adjusted PIN model which relaxes the assumption about the 
negative covariance in the EHO PIN model, and compare the PIN results from theirs and 
the EHO PIN model. They find that the significant difference between the two sets of 
estimates is systematically associated with variables that proxy for liquidity. They also find 
that the results from their adjusted PIN model are unrelated to average returns, unlike the 
estimates from the EHO PIN model. Thus, they conclude that EHO PIN and Adjusted PIN 
estimates are not proxies for information asymmetry, and that PIN is priced because of the 
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illiquidity which happens when information is publicly announced (Grossman and Miller, 
1988).  
 Akay, Cyree, Griffiths and Winters (2012) report supportive evidence for the adjusted 
PIN model of Duarte and Young (2009). While trade clustering can be caused by 
information-based trading and/or liquidity-based trading, Akay et al. (2012) report that 
EHO PIN estimates are priced due to trades clustering which is not associated with 
informed trading. They find positive EHO PIN estimates when they apply the EHO PIN 
estimation method on a sample of securities with minimal informed trading, specifically 
one-month T-bills and three-month GovPX data.  
 Akay et al. (2012) also test the adjusted PIN measure introduced by Duarte and Young 
(2009) but obtain poor PIN estimates due to the corner solutions phenomenon. After 
resolving the corner solutions problem, they obtain PIN results that are similar to those 
obtained using the EHO PIN method. When there is less liquidity provision, they find that 
the buy-sell imbalance is low (the T-bill market is less liquid) and the EHO PIN estimates 
are higher due to a higher likelihood that T-bills will be sold. The reverse is true when there 
is more liquidity provision. They also find that EHO PIN estimates are higher when bid-
ask spreads are wider. While their findings strongly support the conjecture that EHO PIN 
estimates for T-bills are caused by a liquidity-based reason, they only provide indirect 
support for stocks. 
 Li, Wang, Wu, and He (2009) study the relation between expected returns of U.S. 
Treasury bonds and liquidity and information risk. Information asymmetry in the U.S. 
Treasury bonds market is largely due to the interpretation of public information (Green, 
2004; Brandt and Kavajecz, 2004). The authors do not use any trade classification 
algorithm for their GovPX sample set since it includes the trades’ initiators. They find that 
the mean and median of the EHO PIN estimates are positive, and that the rate of the 
information arrival is higher for on-the-run issues than off-the-run issues across different 
bond maturities for all trading days, and for trading days with and without macroeconomics 
news. Since the rate of information arrival is higher for trading days with than without 
macroeconomics news, they conclude that the EHO PIN estimates behave correctly 
throughout the macroeconomic announcement cycles. Furthermore, they find that issues 
that contain the highest EHO PIN estimates are those with the highest liquidity, shortest 
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maturity, lowest spreads, and/or highest depth. The authors argue that their results support 
the EHO PIN estimation method and that they do not support the notions that trade 
misclassifications are the main reason for bias in EHO PIN estimates (Boehmer, Grammig, 
& Theissen, 2007) and that EHO PIN estimates are associated with illiquidity (Duarte and 
Young, 2009).  
 Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2010) also address the conclusion that EHO PIN is only 
a proxy of illiquidity (Duarte and Young, 2009). They examine a sample of ordinary 
common and NYSE- and AMEX-listed stocks from 1983 to 2001 while controlling for the 
size effect on information asymmetry by sorting stocks into size deciles, where size is 
determined by market capitalization. They observe that the EHO PIN estimates are higher 
for larger stocks within each PIN classification and for higher PIN stocks within each size 
classification. They find that their PIN factor (portfolio of long stocks with high PIN and 
short stocks with low PIN) in an augmented Fama-French model affects stocks returns, 
after controlling for the size and liquidity factors (liquidity risk factor of Pástor and 
Stambaugh (2003) and illiquidity measure of Amihud, 2002), and that PIN and liquidity 
have distinct impacts on stocks returns. Their findings refute the criticism that liquidity 
effects explain the relation between PIN and asset returns.  
 Lin and Ke (2011) note that the floating-point exception phenomenon is the cause of the 
downward bias of EHO PIN estimates. The authors adjust the maximum likelihood 
function to remedy the PIN estimation bias and employ the suggestion of Yan and Zhang 
(2006) to select a set of initial numbers for the five parameters used in the EHO PIN 
estimation. They provide evidence showing that the EHO PIN is underestimated due to 
floating-point exception phenomenon for their simulated sample of 2500 hypothetical 
stocks. They also provide empirical results for 1056 NYSE-listed stocks which had their 
IPOs before October 1, 2004 and had frequent trading during the fourth quarter of 2007. 
They use the Lee-Ready algorithm to classify trades and estimate the EHO PIN using the 
original and reformulated maximum likelihood functions. They find that 44 percent of the 
EHO PIN estimates using the original likelihood function are downward-biased and that 
this bias is more pronounced for active stocks. Lin and Ke (2011) argue that previous 
findings which argued that EHO estimates were biased also suffered from the floating point 
exception phenomenon.  
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2.3 Yan and Zhang PIN Specification 
 Yan and Zhang (2012) report that the maximum likelihood functions of Easley et al. 
(2010) and of Lin and Ke (2011) are both subject to a boundary solutions problem, where 
the factorized likelihood functions produce results which likely fall on the boundary 
solutions. Yan and Zhang develop an algorithm that sets the initial values for the five 
parameters of the PIN estimation for the two factorizations. Since their empirical findings 
show that the PIN estimates are less biased when employing the Lin and Ke factorization 
than the EHO factorization, Yan and Zhang (2012) suggest that the reformulated maximum 
likelihood function of Lin and Ke in combination with their algorithm should be adopted 
to remedy the systematic downward bias due to the floating point exceptions phenomenon 
in the EHO PIN estimations. This section presents the Yan and Zhang specification that 
embodies the Easley et al. PIN method.  
 Yan and Zhang develop an algorithm that sets the initial values for the five parameters 
as follows: 𝛼0 = 𝛼𝑖 , 𝛿
0 = 𝛿𝑗 , 𝜀𝑏






0 = 𝑆̅ − 𝛼0. 𝛿0. 𝜇0; where 
𝛼𝑖 (alpha) is the probability that an event occurs at the beginning of each trading day o , 𝛿𝑗 
(delta) is the probability that an event that occurs on day o is bad news, (1-𝛿𝑗)  is the 
probability of good news, 𝜇0 (mu) is the daily arrival rate of order submissions by informed 
traders on day o, 𝜀𝑏
0 (epsilon buy) is the daily arrival rate of buy orders submitted by 
uninformed traders on day o; 𝜀𝑠
0 (epsilon sell) is the daily arrival rate of sell orders 
submitted by uninformed traders on day o, ?̅? is the average number of buys on day o , and 
𝑆̅ is the average number of sells on day o, and 𝛾𝑘 is a quotient of  ?̅?/𝜀𝑏, with the condition 
that 𝛼 and 𝛿 are bounded between 0 and 1 and 𝜇, 𝜀𝑏 , 𝜀𝑠 are no smaller than 0.  The algorithm 
proceeds as follows. Firstly, 125 sets of initial values for each sample are obtained by 
assigning the five fractions of 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9 to each of the parameters 𝛼𝑖,𝛿𝑗, 𝛾𝑘, 
where the Lee-Ready (1991) 5-second rule algorithm is used to classify trades as buyer- or 
seller-initiated. Secondly, the Lin-Ke factorization of the joint likelihood function is run 
for all acceptable sets of parameters. It is given by:  
𝐿(𝐵𝑖, 𝑆𝑖)𝑖=1
𝐼 |𝜃) = ∑ [−
𝐼
𝑖=1
𝜀𝑏 − 𝜀𝑠 + 𝐵𝑖 ln(𝜇 + 𝜀𝑏) + 𝑆𝑖 ln(𝜇 + 𝜀𝑠) +  𝑒max 𝑖] + (1) 
∑ ln [𝛼(1 − 𝛿)exp (
𝐼
𝑖=1




 where 𝜃 = (𝛼, 𝜇, 𝜀𝑏 , 𝜀𝑠, 𝛾), 𝑒max 𝑖 = max(𝑒1 𝑖 , 𝑒2 𝑖 , 𝑒3 𝑖) , 𝑒1 𝑖 = −𝜇 − 𝑆𝑖 ln(1 +
𝜇
𝜀𝑠⁄ ),  
  𝑒2 𝑖 = −𝜇 − 𝐵𝑖 ln(1 +
𝜇
𝜀𝑏⁄ ) , 𝑒3 𝑖 = −𝐵𝑖 ln(1 +
𝜇




In contrast, the EHO factorization of the joint likelihood function (Easley, Hvidkjaer, and 
O’Hara, 2010) is given by:  
𝐿(𝐵𝑖, 𝑆𝑖)𝑖=1
𝐼 |𝜃) = ∑ [−
𝐼
𝑖=1
𝜀𝑏 − 𝜀𝑠 + 𝑀𝑖(ln𝑥𝑏 + ln𝑥𝑠) + 𝐵𝑖 ln(𝜇 + 𝜀𝑏) + 𝑆𝑖 ln(𝜇 + 𝜀𝑠)] (2) 





















 Thirdly, the parameters of the solution for the Lin and Ke factorization of the joint 
likelihood function that has the highest value of the objective function within the boundary 
are selected for each estimation period for each stock in the sample. When all solutions of 
the function fall on the boundary, the parameters of the solution with the highest value 
among the solutions are selected. Finally, the parameters selected are used to estimate the 
probability of informed trading (Easley et al., 2002), where 𝛼𝜇 + 𝜀𝐵 + 𝜀𝑆 is the rate at 
which all orders arrive and 𝛼𝜇 is that rate at which information-based trades arrive (Easley 
et al., 2002). Thus, PIN, which is the ratio of the mean informed trades to the mean total 
trades, is given by: 




In this paper, we subsequently estimate PIN for our sample sets using both the Easley et 
al. and Yan and Zhang (which employs their algorithm on the Lin and Ke factorization) 
estimation methods, and make comparisons for the different windows over the two parties 
in an acquisition ‘life cycle’. The next section presents our sample and data sets. 
3. SAMPLE AND DATA 
 Our sample is collected from the SDC Financial Thomson database that consists of 
AMEX-, NASDAQ-, and NYSE-listed biotech firms that engaged in completed 
acquisitions in the United States from 2005 to 2011. The reason for us to choose acquisition 
events for our sample is that past studies report evidence about the extent of informed 
trading around the announcements of M&As (Ascioglu, McInish, and Wood, 2002; 
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Kryzanowski and Lazrak, 2007; Lipson and Mortal, 2007; Linciano, 2003; King, 2009). 
The biotechnology industry is unique in many ways, including its social network structure, 
the weight of and the secrecy involved with intellectual property, and competitive pricing 
(Scheweizer, 2002). From 1997 onward, consolidation activities in the biotech industry 
intensified, especially with biotech-to-biotech mergers and pharma-to-biotech mergers, 
due to the greater need to benefit from economies of scales and their higher attractiveness 
to capital market participants (Scheweizer, 2002).  
 The individual transaction values of the acquisitions in our sample exceed five million 
dollars. Real estate investment trusts and stocks of companies incorporated outside of the 
U.S. are deleted from the sample. We also eliminate stocks with less than 60 trading days 
because Easley et al. (2012) suggest that this is the minimum number of observations 
required to estimate PIN. Our final sample consists of 41 NYSE-listed acquirers, 14 
NASDAQ-listed acquirers, 2 AMEX-listed acquirers, 8 NYSE-listed targets, 90 
NASDAQ-listed targets, and 1 AMEX-listed target. The acquisition announcement and 
effective dates are also collected from the SDC Financial Thomson database. Table 1 
reports the summary statistics of our sample sets, table 1a and 1b list the acquirers and 
targets in our sample sets, along with acquisition announcement dates and effective dates. 
[Please place table 1 here.] 
 From the NYSE Trades and Automated Quotations database, we collect trades and 
quotes from 9:30 am to 4:00 pm for the acquirers and targets from their primary venues so 
that we have the data within the primary trading period for the firms in our samples. We 
exclude the quotes whose conditions are described in the Appendix A. We select quotes 
where bid and offer sizes are no smaller than zero.  In order to maintain positive bid-ask 
spreads, we eliminate orders where the offer price is smaller or equal to the bid price.1 Only 
quotes posted on the firm’s primary listing venue are retained to minimize the inclusion of 
passive auto-quotes from inactive dealers. We only include good trades that are regular  
(i.e., cash-only basis, cash sale, next-day settlement only, next day, opened last, seller’s 
option, and sold sale) and not later corrected, changed, or signified as canceled due to error.  
                                                          
1 Price is actual trade price per share, which is truncated to five implied decimal places according to TAQ 
User’s Guide, New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Version 3.31. 
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 In a preliminary second step, we apply the Lee-Ready algorithm (1991) to classify trades 
as buys or sells and then calculate the total number of buys and sells per trading day for 
each stock. The reason for the application of the Lee-Ready algorithm is due to a large 
literature that demonstrates the high success rates of this algorithm in comparison with the 
tick, quote, at-the-quote, and Ellis, Michaely and O’Hara algorithms (Lee and 
Radhakrishna, 2000; Chakrabarty et al., 2007; Asquith, Oman, and Safaya, 2010; Aktas 
and Kryzanowski, 2013). Since we are interested in the probability of informed trading 
around both the announcement date (hereafter AD) and the effective date (hereafter ED) 
of each acquisition announcement, we examine the following five windows for each 
acquirer: 60 days pre-announcement or [AD-60: AD-2], three days centered on the 
announcement date [AD-1: AD+1], the period between AD and ED or [AD+2: ED-2], and 
60 days after the ED or [ED+2: ED+60]. We also examine the following three windows 
for each target: 60 days pre-announcement or [AD-60: AD-2], three days centered on the 
announcement date [AD-1: AD+1], and the period between AD and ED or [AD+2: ED-2].  
Since the targets cease to trade on their EDs, we cannot examine the last two periods that 
we examine for acquirers.  
 According to Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2002), a PIN estimate from a sample that 
has less than 60 observations is biased when applying their information-based trading 
model. With only 3 days centered on both AD and ED, we estimate PIN for these two 
periods by increasing the number of observations. Kryzanowski and Lazrak (2007) divide 
each trading day into 78 successive intervals of five-minute lengths (hereafter called 
trading blocks).The authors assign the trading blocks into 10 samples based on a rolling 
basis. For example, the first trading block is assigned to the first sample, the second trading 
block to the second sample, and so on. This design allows them to estimate daily PIN for 
only three days of observations.  Following their intuition, we assign 78 trading blocks into 
13 samples, 26 samples and 39 samples, instead of 10 samples to ensure that our samples 




4. PIN ESTIMATES FOR ACQUIRERS AND TARGETS USING THE 
EASLEY ET AL. MODEL  
 Ascioglu, McInish and Wood (2002) find that the causes of the increase in volume 
trading and positive abnormal returns for targets before merger announcements is informed 
trading and after merger announcements is largely due to liquidity traders. During the four 
days before mergers announcements, the authors find that there is a marked increase in 
trading volume (measured as average cumulative excess volumes) and abnormal returns 
(measured as average cumulative excess returns and average excess returns). Also, they 
find that after mergers announcements, there is a large decrease in bid-ask spreads, bid-ask 
spread standard deviations and the adverse-selection components of the spread. They 
conclude that this phenomenon implies that informed trading activity takes place before 
mergers announcements. For the post-announcement period, the authors find that the 
average trade size is markedly higher than the pre-announcement period and that large size 
trading indicates that trades are performed by large liquidity traders. These findings are 
consistent with the conclusion that high trading activity in the post-announcement period 
is due to uninformed large liquidity traders. Both informed trading before announcements 
and uninformed large liquidity trading after announcements lead to an increase in the 
correlation of order flow across markets.  
 Kryzanowksi and Lazrak (2007) also examine the acquisition as a material event to 
study the extent of information asymmetry. They study trading activity and liquidity for 
the periods around the announcements and effective dates of tender offers, the extent of 
changes of abnormal returns and the probability of informed trading over an acquisition’s 
life cycle. They find that, upon tender offer announcements, trading activity and liquidity 
for targets increase substantially and that there is a strong pressure for targets, especially 
when the cash payment method occurs. They observe that EHO PIN estimates reduce 
markedly after the tender offer announcement for targets. Throughout an acquisition’s life 
cycle, EHO PIN is greater before and upon a tender offer announcement and subsides after 
the announcement, which demonstrates that trades which take place before tender offer 
announcements are highly associated with informed trading and that post-announcement 
trades (or after the release of private and material information) are likely associated with 
uninformed trading.   
12 
 
 Therefore, for our samples, we expect that EHO PIN estimates are high over the window 
centered on announcement dates and then weaken afterwards. Since the announcement of 
the conclusion of an acquisition is also a material event, we expect that EHO PIN estimates 
increase again over the window covering this event. Specially, we expect that EHO PIN 
estimates for the second and the fourth windows to be higher than those of the other 
windows for both acquirers and targets. This conjecture leads to the following hypotheses: 
𝐻0
1𝑎: The EHO PIN estimates do not change throughout the windows identified for the 
acquisition life cycle for acquirers and targets. 
𝐻0
1𝑏: The EHO PIN estimates are the same for the AD and ED windows for acquirers 
and for targets. 
4.1 EHO PIN Estimates for the Acquirers 
 The PIN estimates using the Easley et al. method for the five acquisition life-cycle 
periods for the sample of acquirers and tests of significant differences between the periods 
based on the Wilcoxon signed ranks sum test are reported in tables 2 and 3, respectively. 
Based on table 2, the mean (median) EHO PIN increases from 13.8% (11.6%) in the first 
window or pre-AD to 17% (14.8%) in the second window or AD. The mean in the third 
window or between AD and ED is lower at 12% (10.4%), increases to 19.2% (15.8%) in 
the fourth window or ED, and drops to 12.1% (10.2%) in the fifth window or post-ED. Our 
EHO PIN estimates are reasonably similar to the EHO PIN estimates obtained by a number 
of other studies that are reported in Appendix B.  
 Based on the Wilcoxon test results reported in table 3, we find that the mean (median) 
EHO PIN estimates of the first window are significantly lower than those of the second 
and the fourth windows at the 0.05 (0.01) and 0.01 levels, respectively; but are 
insignificantly higher than those of the third and the fifth windows. The mean (median) 
EHO PIN estimates of the second window are significantly higher than those of the first, 
third, and fifth windows at the 0.05 (0.01), 0.01, and 0.10 (0.01) levels, respectively; but 
are insignificantly lower than that of the fourth window. The mean and median EHO PIN 
estimates of the third window are significantly lower than those of the second and the fourth 
windows at the 0.01 level, but are insignificantly higher than those of the first and the fifth 
windows. The mean and median EHO PIN estimates of the fourth window are higher than 
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those of the first, third, and fifth windows at the 0.01 level, but are insignificantly higher 
than that of the second window. The mean (median) EHO PIN estimates of the fifth 
window are significantly lower than those of the second and the fourth windows at the 0.10 
(0.01) and 0.01 levels, respectively; but are insignificantly lower and higher than those of 
the first and the third windows, respectively. Therefore, based on the significance of the 
differences in the means and medians, we are able to reject the hypothesis 𝐻0
1𝑎 that the 
EHO PIN estimates are unchanged over the five windows in an acquirer’s acquisition life 
cycle, but unable to reject the hypothesis 𝐻0
1𝑏 that the EHO PIN estimates are significantly 
different between the second and the fourth windows. In other words, we find that the EHO 
PIN for the announcement (second) and effective day (fourth) windows are not 
significantly different from each other but tend to be higher than for the other three 
windows.  
[Please place tables 2 and 3 about here.] 
4.2 EHO PIN Estimates for the Targets 
 The PIN estimates using the Easley et al. method for the three acquisition life-cycle 
windows for the sample of targets and tests of significant differences between these periods 
based on the Wilcoxon signed ranks sum test are reported in tables 4 and 5, respectively. 
Based on Table 4, the average (median) of the EHO PIN estimates in the first window rises 
in the second window or AD from 20.2% (17.9%) to 36.6%, (33.5%) and decreases to 28% 
(26.8%) in the third window or between AD and ED. Once again, our EHO PIN estimates 
are close to the results of previous studies presented in Appendix B. 
 Based on the Wilcoxon test results reported in table 5, we find that the mean and median 
EHO PIN estimates of the first window (pre-AD) are significantly lower than those of the 
second (AD) and the third window (between AD and ED) at the 0.01 level. The mean and 
median EHO PIN estimates of the second window are significantly higher than those of 
the first and the third at the 0.01 level. The mean and median EHO PIN estimates of the 
third window are significantly higher and lower than those of the first and the second 
windows, respectively, at the 0.01 level. Thus, we are able to reject the hypothesis 𝐻0
1𝑎 that 
the EHO PIN estimates are unchanged over the three windows in a target’s acquisition life 
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cycle. As expected the EHO PIN estimates are significantly higher during the AD than its 
surrounding periods. 
[Please place tables 4 and 5 about here.] 
5. PIN ESTIMATES FOR ACQUIRERS AND TARGETS USING THE YAN 
AND ZHANG ESTIMATION METHOD 
 As in the previous section, we formulate the following hypotheses for the PIN estimates 
using the Yan and Zhang method or YZ PIN estimates: 
𝐻0
2𝑎: The YZ PIN estimates do not change over the windows identified for the 
acquisition life cycle for acquirers and targets. 
𝐻0
2𝑏: The YZ PIN estimates are the same for the AD and ED windows for acquirers 
and for targets. 
5.1 YZ PIN Estimates for the Acquirers 
 The YZ PIN estimates for the five acquisition life-cycle periods for the sample of 
acquirers and tests of significant differences between the periods based on the Wilcoxon 
signed ranks sum test are reported in tables 6 and 7, respectively. Based on table 6, the 
average (median) of the YZ PIN estimates move from 14.1% (11.3%) in the first window 
to 25.2% (24.3%) in the second window or AD to 14.1% (10.7%) in the third window or 
between AD and ED to 25.1% (23.9%) in the fourth window or ED to 14.7% (11.9%) in 
the fifth window or post-ED. Yan and Zhang (2012) estimate YZ PIN for their sample of 
NYSE- and AMEX-listed stocks over the period from January 1, 1993 to December 31, 
2004 (i.e., for 78,934 stock-quarters). They find that the mean (median) YZ PIN estimates 
for each quarter range from 0.135 (0.117) to 0.174 (0.169). Our YZ PIN estimates in some 
windows with a lower likelihood of informed trading are reasonably close to their 
estimates. As expected, our YZ PIN estimates for the second and fourth windows are 
considerably higher than those of Yan and Zhang (2012) due most likely to our study of 
M&A events. 
 Based on the Wilcoxon test results reported in table 7, we find that the mean and median 
YZ PIN estimates of the first window (pre-AD) are significantly lower than those of the 
second (AD) and the fourth (ED) windows at the 0.01 level, but are insignificantly higher 
and lower than those of the third (between AD and ED) and the fifth (post-ED) windows. 
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The mean and median YZ PIN estimates of the second window are significantly higher 
than those of the first, the third, and the fifth windows at the 0.01 level, but are 
insignificantly higher than that of the fourth window. The mean and median YZ PIN 
estimates of the third window are significantly lower than those of the second and the fourth 
windows, but are insignificantly lower than those of the first and the fifth windows. The 
mean and median YZ PIN estimates of the fourth window are significantly higher than 
those of the first, the third, and the fourth windows at the 0.01 level, but are insignificantly 
lower than that of the second window. The mean and median YZ PIN estimate of the fifth 
window are significantly lower than those of the second and the fourth windows at the 0.01 
level, but are insignificantly higher than those of the first and the third windows. Therefore, 
based on the results of the tests for significance differences between means and medians, 
we are able to reject the hypothesis 𝐻0
2𝑎 that the YZ PIN estimates are unchanged over the 
five windows in an acquirer’s acquisition life cycle, but are not able to reject the hypothesis 
𝐻0
2𝑏 that the YZ PIN estimates are unchanged for the second (AD) and the fourth (ED) 
windows. 
[Please place tables 6 and 7 about here.] 
5.2 YZ PIN Estimates for the Targets 
 The YZ PIN estimates for the three acquisition life-cycle windows for the sample of 
targets and tests of significant differences between the periods based on the Wilcoxon 
signed ranks sum test are reported in tables 8 and 9, respectively. Based on Table 8, the 
average (median) of the YZ PIN estimates in the first window or pre-AD increases from 
20.6% (17.8%) to 37.2% (35.6%) in the second window or AD before declining to 26.9% 
(25.3%) in the third window or between AD and ED. Compared to the YZ PIN estimates 
of Yan and Zhang (2012), our YZ PIN estimates for our targets over a target’s life cycle 
are considerably larger. 
 Based on the Wilcoxon test results reported in table 9, we find that the mean and median 
YZ PIN estimates of the first window (pre-AD) are significantly lower than those of the 
second (between AD and AD) and the third (between AD and ED) windows at the 0.01 
level. The mean and median YZ PIN estimates of the second window are significantly 
higher than those of the first and the third windows at the 0.01 level. Therefore, we are able 
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to reject the hypothesis 𝐻0
2𝑎 that YZ PIN estimates remain unchanged over a target’s 
acquisition life cycle over the three windows. Once again, we find that the PIN estimates 
become significantly higher for the period around ADs compared to the surrounding 
periods of time. 
[Please place tables 8 and 9 here.] 
6. COMPARISON OF THE PIN ESTIMATES BETWEEN ACQUIRERS AND 
TARGETS FOR EACH ESTIMATION MODEL 
 Some studies find that informed trading is associated more with targets than with 
acquirers. Ascioglu, McInish, and Wood (2002) show that trading volume and abnormal 
returns for targets before and after a merger announcement are significantly higher than in 
other periods and are more pronounced than for acquirers. Kryzanowski and Lazak (2007) 
find that trading activity for targets is more active than for acquirers upon merger 
announcements and the degree of information asymmetry for targets changes more 
significantly than for acquirers throughout an acquisition’s life cycle. We posit that the PIN 
estimates for targets are higher than for acquirers. Therefore, we test the following 
hypotheses: 
𝐻0
3𝑎: The EHO PIN estimates for acquirers and targets are unchanged over the 
comparable windows 
𝐻0
3𝑏: The YZ PIN estimates for acquirers and targets are unchanged over the 
comparable windows 
6.1 Comparison of the EHO PIN Estimates for Acquirers and Targets 
 The statistical differences of EHO PIN estimates for the three acquisition life-cycle 
periods between acquirers and targets are tested by using Whitney Man Wilcoxon test. The 
results are reported in table 10. Based on these results, we find that the mean and median 
EHO PIN estimates for acquirers are significantly lower than those for targets at the 0.01 
level for all three common windows. Therefore, we are able to reject the hypothesis 𝐻0
3𝑎 
that the EHO PIN estimates are the same for acquirers and targets before the AD of an 
acquisition. 
[Please place table 10 about here.] 
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6.2 Comparison of the YZ PIN Estimates for Acquirers and Targets 
 The statistical differences of the mean and median YZ PIN estimates for the three 
acquisition life-cycle periods (pre-AD, AD, and between AD and ED) between acquirers 
and targets are tested by using the Whitney-Man-Wilcoxon test and the results are reported 
in table 11. Based on these results, we find that the mean and median YZ PIN estimates for 
acquirers are significantly lower than those for targets for all three common windows at 
the 0.01 level. Thus, we are able to reject the hypothesis 𝐻0
3𝑏 that the YZ PIN estimates are 
the same for acquirers and targets before, during, and after the announcement dates. 
[Please place table 11 about here.] 
7. COMPARISON OF THE TWO PIN ESTIMATES FOR ACQUIRERS AND 
FOR TARGETS 
 Lin and Ke (2011) state that the numerical maximum likelihood functions, which take 
into account the daily average buys and sells per stock, used in the EHO PIN estimation 
are subject to a floating-point exception, which involves overflow and underflow 
possibilities,2 and thus lead to the elimination of the actual parameters of stocks that have 
large daily average buys and sells. Lin and Ke (2011) reconstruct the maximum likelihood 
functions and prove that the EHO likelihood functions lead to a downward bias in the EHO 
PIN estimations. The authors claim that their reconstructed functions can mitigate the 
floating-point exception phenomenon, and also provide empirical evidence using their 
simulation and historical data showing that the EHO PIN estimates are subject to a 
downward bias for stocks with a large number of trades. Yan and Zhang (2012) support 
Lin and Ke (2011) statement and provide evidence showing that the PIN estimations using 
the EHO factorized likelihood functions are subject to a downward bias due to the 
boundary solutions to the floating-point exceptions phenomenon. They find that their PIN 
estimation method, which applies the Lin and Ke (2011) factorized likelihood function, 
produces PIN estimates that are larger than the PIN estimates using the EHO PIN 
                                                          
2 The CMU Common Lisp defines underflow as “This exception occurs when the result of an operation is too small to 
be represented as a normalized float in its format. If trapping is enabled, the floating-point-underflow condition is 
signalled. Otherwise, the operation results in a denormalized float or zero” and overflow as “This exception occurs 
when the result of an operation is too large to be represented as a float in its format. If trapping is enabled, the floating-




estimation method. In this section, we compare the EHO and YZ PIN estimates for the 
acquirers and for the targets over their acquisition life cycles.  
 We expect that EHO PIN estimates are smaller than those of YZ PIN estimates for both 
acquirers and targets over their corresponding acquisition windows, especially the 
windows where the PIN estimates are significantly larger than those of the other windows. 
Our expectations lead to the following hypotheses: 
𝐻0
4𝑎: The EHO PIN estimates are the same as the YZ PIN estimates for acquirers 
𝐻0
4𝑏: The EHO PIN estimates are the same as the YZ PIN estimates for targets 
7.1 Comparison of PIN Estimates between the Two Estimation Methods for 
Acquirers 
 The tests of significant differences between EHO PIN and YZ PIN estimates based on 
the Wilcoxon signed ranks sum test over the acquisition life cycle of the five windows for 
acquirers are reported in table 12. Based on these results, we find that the mean and median 
YZ PIN estimates are significantly higher than the mean and median EHO PIN estimates 
at the 0.01 level for the second (AD) and the fourth (ED) windows. For the first, the third, 
and the fifth windows, the mean and median YZ PIN estimates are insignificantly higher 
than the mean and median EHO PIN estimates. Therefore, we are able to reject the 
hypothesis 𝐻0
4𝑎 that the EMO PIN estimates are the same as the YZ PIN estimates for 
corresponding AD and ED windows for acquirers.  
[Please place table 12 about here.] 
7.2 Comparison of PIN Estimates between the Two Estimation Methods for 
Targets 
 The tests for significant differences between EHO PIN and YZ PIN estimates based on 
the Wilcoxon signed ranks sum test over the acquisition life cycle of the three windows for 
targets are reported in table 13. Based on these results, we find that the mean and median 
YZ PIN estimates are insignificantly higher than the mean and median EHO PIN estimates 
for all three windows. Therefore, we cannot reject the hypothesis 𝐻0
4𝑏 that the EHO PIN 
estimates are the same as the YZ PIN estimates for targets. 
[Please place table 13 about here.] 
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8. TESTS OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE EHO PIN ESTIMATES TO THE 
WITHIN-DAY NUMBER OF SAMPLES FOR THE AD AND ED WINDOWS 
 Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2002) claim that their PIN estimations are biased for a 
sample that has less than 60 observations. In this section, we examine the extent of the 
sensitivity of the PIN estimates to the number of observations by comparing the EHO PIN 
estimates between the 13, 26, and 39 samples for the second and the fourth windows. We 
expect that the EHO PIN estimates will change markedly between different samples where 
each sample contains different numbers of trading blocks. The specific hypothesis tested 
are: 
𝐻0
5𝑎: The EMO PIN estimates do not change across the three samples with different 
trading blocks assignments for acquirers 
𝐻0
5𝑏: The EMO PIN estimates do not change across the three samples with different 
trading blocks assignments for targets 
8.1 PIN Estimate Sensitivity to Number of Observations for the AD and ED for 
Acquirers 
 The PIN estimates using the Easley et al. method for the second window (AD) for the 
three trading blocks assignments (13, 26, and 39 samplings) for acquirers and tests of 
significant differences between them based on the Wilcoxon signed rank sums tests are 
reported in table 14. Based on these results, we find that the mean and median EHO PIN 
estimates of the 13 samplings are significantly lower than those of the 26 and the 39 
samplings at the 0.01 level. The mean and median EHO PIN estimates of the 26 sampling 
are significantly lower than those of the 39 sampling at the 0.01 and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. Therefore, we are able to reject the hypothesis 𝐻0
5𝑎 that the EHO PIN 
estimates are unchanged across the three samplings with different trading blocks 
assignment for acquirers. The EHO PIN estimates significantly increase when the number 
of samplings increase, and thus are quite sensitive to the number of observations used in 
their estimation. 
[Please place table 14 about here.] 
 The PIN estimates using the Easley et al. method for the fourth (or ED) window for the 
three trading blocks assignments for acquirers and tests of their significant differences are 
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reported in table 15. Based on these results, we find that the mean and median EHO PIN 
estimates of the 13 samplings are significantly lower than those of the 26 and the 39 
samplings at the 0.01 level. The mean and median EHO PIN estimates of the 26 samplings 
are significantly lower than that of the 39 samplings at the 0.01 and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. Therefore, we are able to reject the hypothesis 𝐻0
5𝑎 that the EHO PIN 
estimates are unchanged across the three samplings with different trading blocks 
assignments for acquirers. As for AD, we find that the EHO PIN estimates increase 
significantly as the number of observations used in their estimation increases. 
[Please place table 15 about here.] 
8.2 PIN Estimate Sensitivity to Number of Observations for the AD for Targets 
 The PIN estimates using the Easley et al. method for the second (or AD) window for 
the three trading blocks assignments for targets and tests of significant differences between 
them based on the Wilcoxon signed rank sums tests are reported in table 16. Based on these 
results, we find that the mean (median) EHO PIN estimates of the 13 samplings are 
significantly lower than those of the 26 at the 0.01 (0.10) level and those of the 39 
samplings at 0.01 level. The mean (median) EHO PIN estimates of the 26 samplings are 
significantly lower than those of the 39 samplings at the 0.01 (0.05) level. Therefore, we 
are able to reject the hypothesis 𝐻0
5𝑏 that the EHO PIN estimates are unchanged across the 
three samplings with different trading blocks assignments for targets. Thus, the EHO PIN 
estimates also increase significantly when the number of observations used in their 
estimation increases. 
[Please place table 16 about here.] 
9. TESTS FOR INFORMATION LEAKAGE 
 Some studies (Anilowski et al., 2009 and Sanders and Zdanowicz, 1992) report that 
takeover negotiations begin around three to five months before the first public 
announcements and that information leakage takes place during that period. In this section, 
we begin with a review of the relevant literature before proceeding to a specification of the 
hypotheses to be tested and a presentation of the results of such tests. 
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9.1 Relevant Literature 
 There is considerable empirical evidence that document the stock price run-up (decrease 
or break-even) phenomenon observed in target (acquirer) firms over the three days around 
ADs (Leeth and Borg, 2000; Mitchell, Pulvino, and Stafford, 2004; Agrawal and Nasser, 
2012; Fu, Lin and Officer, 2013). The explanations of the phenomenon include the 
information asymmetry or the leakage of private information (Schwert, 1996; Agrawal and 
Nasser, 2012), the change of financial regulations (Leeth and Borg, 2000), agency 
problems (Fu, Lin and Officer, 2013), and the downward price pressure caused by mergers 
arbitrageurs (Mitchell, Pulvino, and Stafford, 2004). Our research provides supportive 
evidence that information asymmetry contributes partially to the short-term changes of the 
wealth of the shareholders of targets and acquirers upon M&A announcements. 
 Schwert (1996) suggests that the information leakage and market anticipation of a 
merger in the two months prior to announcements lead to the pre-bid price run-ups. For a 
sample consisting of 1814 targets from 1975 to 1991, Schwert finds that CARs start to 
increase significantly (remain highly positive) during the two months before (around) ADs. 
After ADs, the CARs increase (decrease) for a year if the takeovers are successful 
(unsuccessful). When testing for the relation between the pre-bid price run-ups and the 
premiums paid by bidders for successful acquired targets, Schwert finds a positive 
correlation of 1. This is consistent with the markup pricing hypothesis (Walkling and 
Edmister, 1985; Comment and Schwert, 1995) that the pre-bid price run-ups are unrelated 
to post-bid price run-ups and that the final deal price paid by bidders increases under the 
pre-bid price run-ups effect. His findings suggest that there is informed trading activity 
before ADs and the cost is suffered by bidders.  
 Leeth and Borg (2000) document evidence of pre-bid price run-ups for their samples of 
acquirers and targets over the 1919-1930 period. They argue that financial regulations do 
not explain the performance of shareholders’ wealth upon merger announcements. Given 
the unique financial and economic environment of the 1920s, the authors examine the 
wealth changes of shareholders upon merger announcements and find that shareholders 
gains, measured by monthly market-adjusted abnormal returns, in the 1920s are not 
significantly different from those in the 1960s. 
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 Mitchell, Pulvino, and Stafford (2004) show that merger arbitrage before and upon 
M&A announcements and index rebalancings around M&A closings are the causes of 
losses for the shareholders of acquirers upon M&As. The authors find that the negative 
CAARs over the period around ADs for a set of 2130 mergers from 1994 to 2000 are due 
to the downward price pressure caused by mergers arbitrageurs who short-sell acquirers’ 
stocks and buy targets’ stocks in fixed-exchange-ratio transactions. The short-time 
downward-sloping demand curves for the stocks of acquirers challenges the assumption of 
perfect elasticity of the demand curves for stocks. Additionally, the authors report that 
index rebalancings around merger closings cause the outward shifts of the demand curves 
of stocks for acquirers and that the increase in the demand does not relate to information 
used to predict the future returns for acquirers.  
 Fu, Lin and Officer (2013) prove evidence for the overvaluation of acquisitions and that 
this is caused by agency problems (Jensen, 2005). They examine acquisition premiums, 
measured by cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), for the period of 42 days before AD for 
three groups: cash acquisitions and stock acquisitions that are classified as driven versus 
not driven by stock overvaluation. They find that only stock acquisitions that are driven by 
stock overvaluation have a significant decline in acquisition premiums during the pre-AD 
period. Specifically, acquisitions premiums increase when the overvaluation of acquirers 
relative to targets increases. They also find that acquisition premiums are positively 
(negatively) correlated with size (leverage) and with hostile deals. Tobin’s Q, returns on 
assets from operating activities, market-adjusted 12 month stock returns prior to the AD, 
and the standard deviation of returns for the 213 days before the bid period cannot explain 
the acquisition premiums. Fu, Lin and Officer (2013) examine the change of performances 
(measured by operating ROAs and asset turnovers) of the three groups of acquisitions for 
the nine fiscal years surrounding AD and find that only overvalued stock acquirers are 
subject to a abnormal declines in operating performances after their acquisitions. The 
comparison of the performances of overvalued acquirers and those of matched-and-
overvalued non-acquiring firms shows that the latter do not suffer significant abnormal 
declines during the nine fiscal years surrounding the ADs. Finally, the authors find that the 
CEOs of overvalued acquirers gain a higher increase in wealth than those of overvalued 
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non-acquirers. Therefore, they conclude that agency problems (Jensen, 2005) are the cause 
of the overvalued acquisitions.  
 Apris, Foley, and Frino (2012) find that target price run-ups before M&A 
announcements are explained by the market anticipation derived from public information 
(Jensen and Ruback, 1983). The authors adjust event dates without a rumors effect for their 
targets and examine the changes of CARs for the 30 days before ADs. They find that the 
acquisition of toeholds, regardless of size, shortly prior to takeover announcements causes 
the pre-bid target price run-up. This finding supports the theory (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; 
Bris, 2002) that the market anticipation of a successful takeover signalled by the toehold 
activity leads to the target price run-up before takeover announcements. The price run-up 
is positively correlated with the target size which is measured by using market value as a 
proxy. Since the authors find that there is no significant difference between the CARs of 
their selected targets and matched targets with unsuccessful takeovers, they conclude that 
insider trading does not explain the target price run-up before ADs. 
 Bae, Chang, and Kim (2013) examine possible CAR determinants for the AD windows 
for 672 U.S. acquirers and their international public and private targets over the period 
from 1996 to 2002. Not only are 60 percent of the M&As within the same industry but the 
proportion of high-tech M&As is material. Determinants include acquirers’ characteristics 
(Tobin’s q ratio, total assets and total debt ratio based on data from Compustat for the fiscal 
year preceding the year of the M&A), industry factors (high-tech, same industry, publicly 
or privately traded) for targets, national and market factors (market liquidity, market 
transparency and information asymmetry of the country of the targets) and deal 
characteristics (payment method, and if hostile or tender-offer). They find that the CARs 
of acquirers acquiring private targets are significantly larger when their total assets are 
smaller and/or their R&D ratios are higher and when acquiring public targets. The 
differences in the CARs are more significant when the targets are located in low-liquidity 
markets. In low transparency countries, acquirers obtain higher CARs when they acquire 
private targets. Their results are generally robust when self-selection models (Heckman, 
1979) are used to correct for any endogeneity bias in the univariate tests. 
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9.2 Hypotheses on the Changes of CARs Before and Around ADs for Acquirers 
and Targets 
 Based on the findings of the above literature, we begin by examining the significance 
of the CARs for the acquirers and targets for the period of sixty days before the 
announcement day or [AD-60, AD-2] and the period of three days around the 
announcement day or [AD-1, AD+1] windows, and their changes from the previous to the 
later period. We test the following hypotheses:  
𝐻0
6𝑎: CARs over the pre-announcement and announcement periods are insignificant 
for acquirers. 
𝐻0
6𝑏:  CARs over the pre-announcement and announcement periods are insignificant 
for targets. 
 𝐻0
7𝑎: CARs on the announcement days are unchanged in comparison with those for 
the 60-day period before the AD for acquirers 
 𝐻0
7𝑏:  CARs on the announcement days are unchanged in comparison with those for 
the 60-day period before the AD for targets 
9.3 Empirical Results on the CARs Before and Around ADs for Acquirers and 
Targets 
9.3.1 Examination of the Changes of CARs for Acquirers and Targets Before and 
Around ADs 
 To test hypotheses 𝐻0
6𝑎 and 𝐻0
7𝑎, we first obtain the CARs for the period of sixty days 
before the announcement days or [AD-60, AD-2] window and the period of three days 
centered on the announcement days or [AD-1, AD+1] window for both acquirers and 
targets by using the Carhart four-factor model (1997), where the market index is 
alternatively equally-weighted  and value-weighted. We run a one-sample t-test and both 
sign and sign ranked tests to examine the significance of mean and median CARs, 
respectively, for acquirers and targets over the two windows.  
 Table 17 reports the results of the one sample t-test (sign and signed rank tests) for the 
means (medians) of CARs for acquirers and targets in panel A (B). Based on panel A, the 
mean CARs based on both market indexes decrease insignificantly over the [AD-60, AD-
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2] and [AD-1, AD+1] windows for acquirers. However, for targets, the means of the CARs 
based on both market indexes increase significantly over [AD-60, AD-2] window at the 
0.05 and 0.0001 levels, respectively.  Based on panel B, the median CARs for acquirers 
based on both market indexes are insignificantly changed over the two windows. However, 
the medians CARs based on both market indexes are significantly positive over the [AD-
60, AD-2] and [AD-1, AD+1] windows at the 0.001 and 0.0001 levels, respectively. These 
findings show that there is a pre-bid price run-up for targets only. Therefore, we are unable 
to reject the hypothesis 𝐻0
6𝑎 that CARs over the pre-announcement and announcement 
periods are insignificant for acquirers, but are able to reject the hypothesis 𝐻0
6𝑏 for targets.  
[Please place table 17 about here.] 
 Table 18 reports the results of the Wilcoxon sign ranked sum tests on the differences in 
the means (panel A) and medians (panel B) CARs over the [AD-60, AD-2] window from 
those over the AD-1, AD+1] window for acquires and targets, separately. We observe that 
both the means and medians of the CARs based on both market indexes for acquirers are 
insignificantly different between the pre-announcement and announcement periods. 
However, both the means and medians of the CARs based on both market indexes for 
targets increase significantly at the 0.0001 percent level from the pre-announcement to the 
announcement period. Therefore, we are unable to reject the hypothesis 𝐻0
7𝑎 that the mean 
CARs around the announcement days are the same as those over the period of 60 days 
before the ADs for acquirers, but are able to reject hypothesis 𝐻0
7𝑏 for targets. 
[Please place table 18 about here.] 
The above findings on the CARs around the ADs of acquires and targets are consistent 
with the previous empirical findings on the wealth changes for shareholders before and 
around takeover announcements as the CARs are highly positive before ADs for targets, 
but remain unchanged or negative for acquirers. In the next section, we identify 
significant determinants of the positive CARs for acquirers (even though their CARs are 
insignificant) and targets. 
9.3.2 Empirical Results on the Determinants of CARs around ADs for Acquirers 
and Targets 
 Based on the literature about the determinants of CARs around takeover announcements 
discussed above, we run cross-sectional regressions for our samples of acquirers and 
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targets, where the dependent variables are the CARs around the ADs, and the independent 
variables are described as follows: 
 Debt-to-Equity ratio or DTE is the ratio of total liabilities to total equity of 
shareholders, which is a proxy for a firm’s financial risk, measured at fiscal year-
end before the ADs of the acquirers and targets. 
 Book-to-Market Value ratio or BTM is the ratio of total book value to market 
value in millions of dollars, measured at fiscal year-end before the ADs of the 
acquirers and targets. 
 The natural logarithm of total assets in millions of dollars, which is a proxy for a 
firm’s size, measured at the fiscal year end before the ADs of acquirers and targets, 
or Size(LnTA). 
 The natural logarithm of one plus the ratio of shares owned by institutional investors 
to total common shares traded or IH, following Hartzell and Starks (2003), Cornett, 
Marcus, and Tehranian (2008), and Brennan, Huh and Subrahmanyam (2013), 
measured at the fiscal year end before the ADs. 
 The natural logarithm of one plus the ratio of stock that is held directly by insiders 
to total shares tradable or ISHD, following Starks and Titman (2006) and Sias and 
Whidbee (2010), of the 12 months before to 2 months prior to the ADs. Since we 
find significant CARs over the 60 days before the ADs for targets, we want to 
examine the potential effect of direct insider holdings on CARs before this period 
of significant change in the CARs around ADs.3 
 The natural logarithm of total R&D expenses in millions of dollars based on the 
fiscal year end before the ADs for acquirers and targets, or LnRD. 
 All the financial statement variables are obtained from Compustat for the fiscal year-
end preceding the ADs of each firm. The institutional and insider holdings data are 
collected from the (13f) Holding and Insider Filing Table 1, respectively, in the Thomson 
Reuters database for the year-end that is at least two months prior to the AD of each firm. 
                                                          
3 In unreported test results, we find that total direct insider holdings, total direct plus indirect insider 
holdings, and total institutional holdings change insignificantly from the twelve months to the six months 
before the two months prior to the takeover announcements for acquirers and targets. 
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 We obtain our expectations for the expected relation between the CARs and their 
potential determinants from the literature. Fu, Lin and Officer (2013) show that premiums 
paid by overvalued acquirers are paid by acquirers with larger size, with lower leverage, 
and /or engaged in hostile deals. Bea et al. (2013) find that CARs around ADs of targets 
have a significant and negative relationship with both public targets and target size. Thus, 
we conjecture that the size of acquirers (targets) is positively (negatively) correlated with 
the CARs around ADs, and that the leverage of acquirers (targets) is negatively (positively) 
correlated with CARs around ADs. Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) find a 
positive correlation between the book-to-market ratio and the average abnormal returns 
upon share repurchase announcements, which is largely caused by the mistaken response 
of the market to the information content of the announcements. We conjecture that there is 
a positive relation between our CARs around ADs and book-to-market ratios. 
 Bea et al. (2013) also find a negative relation between the R&D ratio and the CARs of 
targets around ADs. However, since R&D activities are associated with high information 
asymmetry (Aboody and Lev, 2000; Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006), we conjecture that 
R&D expense is a positive determinant of CARs around ADs of both acquirers and targets. 
 Schwert (1996) finds an insignificant and negative relation between pre-bid insider 
holdings and pre-bid price run-ups. Agrawal and Nasser (2012) only find that the pre-bid 
price run-ups of targets are positively associated with the net numbers of shares bought by 
insiders during a year before the ADs. If the insignificant CARs for acquirers are caused 
largely by strong monitoring of informed trading in their stocks, we expect that the number 
of insider holdings for acquirers should be negatively related to their CARs around the 
ADs. Vice versa, we conjecture that the relation is positive for targets because of the 
stronger effect of the leakage of information about the possible success of the takeovers of 
the targets.  
 Sias, Starks and Titman (2006) find a significant and positive (negative) relation 
between the changes in the number and percentage of quarterly institutional holdings with 
the cumulative monthly and weekly abnormal returns over the previous (subsequent) 12 
months. The authors state that institutional investors are more informed than the public and 
incorporate their information into their trading and cause the upward movement of the 
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CARs. Larger institutional investors have more impact on the movement than smaller 
institutional investors. We conjecture a positive correlation between our CARs and the 
number of institutional holdings over the fiscal year ended before the ADs for both our 
acquirers and targets.  
 We estimate the cross-sectional regressions of the means of the CARs for the [AD-1, 
AD+1] windows on the potential independent variables. The cross-sectional regressions 
results for acquirers and targets are reported in tables 19 and 20, respectively. In table 19, 
we find that only the size of acquirers is significantly and positively correlated with the 
CARs for the [AD-1, AD+1] window based on both equally and value weighted market 
indexes for acquirers at the 0.05 level. These findings are consistent with our conjecture 
based on the findings of Fu, Lin and Officer (2013) that the cost of the overvaluation of the 
stocks of acquirers before and around the ADs are paid for by their shareholders.  
[Please place tables 19 and 20 about here.] 
 In table 20, we find that only the size of targets is significantly and negatively correlated 
with the CARs for the [AD-1, AD+1] window based on both equally and value weighted 
market indexes for acquirers at the 0.05 level. These findings are consistent with our 
conjecture based on the finding of Bea et al. (2013) that CARs around ADs of targets have 
a significant and negative relationship with targets whether or not they are public or private 
companies. Additionally, we find that the book-to-market ratios are significantly and 
positively correlated with the CARs for the [AD-1, AD+1] window based on both equally 
and value weighted market indexes for targets at the 0.10 percent. This finding only for 
targets is consistent with the finding of Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) that 
value stocks are more related with positive CARs around ADs. 
 In summary, we find that firm size positively (negatively) affects the performance of 
the CARs for the ADs for acquirers (targets) and that book-to-market ratios only 
positively affect the performance of the CARs for the ADs for targets.  
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 10. DETERMINANTS OF THE PROBABILITY OF INFORMATION-BASED 
TRADING 
10.1 Relevant Literature 
 As reported in section 8, the EHO and YZ PIN estimates are significant for the 
announcement (AD) and effective day (ED) windows. Thus, the question that we address 
next is: What are the determinants of this proxy for information asymmetry or informed 
trading for high-tech M&As?  We begin with a review of the relevant literature before 
proceeding to a specification of the hypotheses to be tested and a presentation and 
discussion of the results from conducting such tests. 
 Chae, Chung, and Yang (2007) run cross-sectional regressions for the CARs for M&A 
ADs on information asymmetry variables derived from the Glosten-Harris and Hasbrouck-
Foster-Viswanathan models. For their M&A sample for acquirers listed on the Korean 
stock market from 1994 to 2005, they find that higher information asymmetries are 
negatively associated with firm size, credit ratings, cash flow surplus, and leverage rates.  
 Aslan, Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2008) find the determinants of their PIN 
estimates for 35,722 firm-years of NYSE- and AMEX-listed stocks over the period from 
1983 to 1999. They do this by running cross-sectional regressions where the firm 
characteristics are estimated by using pooled regressions and Fama-MacBeth (1973) 
regressions over each firm-year. They find that PINs are negatively and significantly 
associated with firm size, firm age, analyst coverage, Tobin’s q and share turnover, and 
positively and significantly associated with returns on assets, and the annualized standard 
deviations of daily returns. They also find that firms in more stable and less dynamic 
industries have lower PINs. 
 Brennan, Huh, and Subrahmanyam (2013) decompose the PIN measure into the 
probabilities of informed trading based on good and bad news (PIN_G and PIN_B, 
respectively).  They use the Yan and Zhang (2010) algorithm with 125 pre-specified sets 
of initial values for the five parameters to obtain PIN, PIN_G, and PIN_B estimates for a 
set of 985,007 firm-months for selective NYSE-and AMEX-listed stocks over the period 
from January 1983 to December 2010. Their first finding based on monthly cross-sectional 
regressions for each PIN measure is that the standard deviations of daily returns for the 
previous 12 months (insider holdings) are only negatively (positively) associated with 
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PIN_B (PIN_G). This finding indicates that stocks with higher return volatilities are 
associated with less informed trading based on bad news, and are unrelated with informed 
trading based on good news. Their second finding is that value stocks (growth stocks) are 
associated more with PIN_B (PIN_G). Their third finding is that analyst coverage is 
significantly and negatively associated with the three PIN measures although the relation 
is stronger for PIN_B than for PIN_G. Their fourth finding is that firm size or the month-
end market value of equity has the strongest negative effect on the three PIN measures. 
Finally, they find that high-tech firms are more exposed to the probability of informed 
trading, and mostly to the informed trading that is based on good news.  
 A cross-sectional test in Kumar and Popescu (2014) reveals a strong and positive 
correlation between their PIN estimates and the natural logarithm of insider trading 
volumes, and a strong negative correlation between their PIN estimates and the natural 
logarithms of market values and share turnovers.  Moreover, their PIN estimates are highly 
and positively related to the EHO PIN estimates and with measures of the price impacts of 
trades.   
10.2 Methodology and Empirical Results on Determinants of PINs for Acquirers 
and Targets 
10.2.1  Cross-sectional regression tests and results 
 In this section, we run cross-sectional regressions using the firm characteristics variables 
described in section 9 to test the determinants of PINs for the ADs. Based on the literature 
review above, we expect that PINs for the ADs of acquirers are positively related to the 
financial leverage ratio as firms with high information asymmetries require higher internal 
financing (Chae, Chung, Yang, 2007). We also expect that the PINs of acquirers (targets) 
are negatively (positively) correlated with firm size because larger firms have less private 
information due to a higher external monitoring of their activities (Chae, Chung, and Yang, 
2007; Aslan, Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara, 2008; Brennan, Huh, and Subrahmanyam, 
2013) and targets are generally smaller than acquirers. Higgins and Rodriguez (2006) show 
that the uncertainties associated with R&D successes lead to higher information 
asymmetry. Thus, we expect the PINs to be positively correlated with R&D expenses. 
Brennan, Huh, and Subrahmanyam (2013) suggest that firms with higher insider holdings 
tend to have higher informed trading on good news. We conjecture that the relations 
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between insider holdings and the PINs are negative for acquirers and positive for targets 
because the CARs for M&As announcements are bad (good) news for the shareholders of 
acquirers (targets). Since institutional investors are likely to be informed investors, we 
expect a positive relationship between institutional holdings and PINs (Aslan, Easley, 
Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara, 2008). Based on the finding of Brennan, Huh, and Subrahmanyam 
(2013) that value (growth) stocks are associated more with PIN_B (PIN_G), we expect a 
positive relation between our PINs and the book-to-market ratios. 
 Table 21 reports the cross-sectional regressions results for the YZ PINs and EMO PINs 
for the ADs for the acquirers in panels A and B, respectively. We find that the book-to-
market-ratio and the natural logarithm of one plus the ratio of stocks held directly by 
insiders to total shares traded are positively associated with YZ PINs around ADs for 
acquirers at the 0.05 level and with EMO PINs for the ADs for acquirers at the 0.01 and 
0.05 levels, respectively. We find that the ratio of total liabilities to total equities of 
shareholders or the proxy for a firm’s financial risk are positively associated with YZ PINs 
for the ADs for acquirers at the 0.10 level but is insignificantly associated with EMO PINs 
for the ADs for acquirers.  
 Our first finding indicates that value stocks of acquirers are associated more with PINs. 
In the previous section, our CARs around the ADs for acquirers are unchanged from the 
60 days before the ADs to the three days around the ADs. Takeover announcements are 
thus deemed bad news for the stockholders of acquirers. Therefore, our finding on the 
positive relation between the book-to-market ratio and PINs is consistent with the finding 
of Brennan, Huh, and Subrahmanyam (2013) that value stocks (growth stocks) are 
associated more with PIN_B (PIN_G).  
 Our second finding is that acquirers with higher direct insider holdings over the 12 
months prior to the two months before the ADs are associated more with PIN. This is 
consistent with previous findings that positive PINs reflect insider activities upon takeover 
intentions. Brennan, Huh, and Subrahmanyam (2013) find that insider holdings are 
negatively associated with the probability of trading that is based on good news. If takeover 
announcements are deemed bad news for acquirer stockholders, the relation between PINs 
for the ADs for acquirers and PINs should be negative, which is counter to what we find 
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in our test results. We leave a closer examination on this good versus bad news story for 
future research. 
 Our third finding on the positive and significant association between the financial 
leverage of acquirers and YZ PINs for the ADs is consistent with our expectation that PINs 
for the ADs of acquirers are positively related to the financial leverage ratio as firms with 
high information asymmetries require higher internal financing (Chae, Chung, Yang, 2007) 
and supports the pecking order theory (Myers, 1984) that “companies with high 
information asymmetry which require more internal reserves have higher leverage and will 
benefit more through M&A since they will be able to increase internal financing sources” 
(page 30). 
[Please place table 21 about here.] 
 Table 22 reports the cross-sectional regression results for the targets. We find a 
significant and negative relation between firm size with YZ PIN (EHO PIN) estimates at 
the 0.05 (0.01) level. The natural logarithm of total R&D expense is significantly and 
negatively correlated with YZ PIN estimates at the 0.05 level. There is also a significant 
and positive relation between the natural logarithm of one plus the ratio of shares owned 
by institutional investors to total common shares traded and the YZ PIN and EHO PIN 
estimates at the 0.10 level. 
Our first finding indicates that targets with larger sizes are associated with less PINs 
around the ADs. This finding is consistent with previous findings (Chae, Chung, and Yang, 
2007; Aslan, Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara, 2008; Brennan, Huh, and Subrahmanyam, 
2013; Kumar and Popescu, 2014) which supports the theory that larger firms have 
economies of scale in reducing information asymmetry.  
Our second finding indicates that targets with larger R&D expenses have less PINs 
around the ADs. This negative relation does not support the argument of Higgins and 
Rodriguez (2006) that the success uncertainty of R&D investment activities leads to higher 
information asymmetry.  
Our third finding indicates that institutional holdings have a positive effect on PINs 
around the ADs for targets, which is consistent with our conjecture that since institutional 
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investors are likely to be informed traders and that their trading should reflect informed 
information (Aslan, Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara, 2008). 
 [Please place table 22 about here.] 
11. CONCLUSIONS 
We examine the PIN for biotech M&As that occurred from 2005 to 2011 by employing 
the Easley et al. and newly introduced Yan and Zhang estimation methods. We find 
positive PIN estimates under both measures throughout the acquisition life cycles for both 
acquirers and targets. These findings are consistent with the large literature on the extent 
of information asymmetry around M&As. We find that the Yan and Zhang PIN estimation 
method has less downward-bias that is generally not significantly different than that from 
the Easley et al. estimation method. We provide supportive evidence that the reformulated 
likelihood function introduced by Lin and Ke (2011) and the Yan and Zhang algorithm can 
(generally not significantly) mitigate the downward bias of the EHO PIN estimation 
method for our samples of acquirers and targets. In addition, by elaborating on the sampling 
procedure proposed by Kryzanowski and Lazrak (2007), we demonstrate that EHO PIN 
estimates are sensitive to the number of observations.  
We find that firm size has a positive and negative impact on the CARs for ADs for 
acquirers and targets, respectively and that the book-to-market ratio has a positive impact 
on the CARs for ADs for targets. We conclude that there is leakage of information prior to 
M&A announcements which is strongly affected by some firm characteristics. The book-
to-market ratio, insider holdings and financial leverage are identified as having a positive 
impact on PINs for acquirers around takeover announcement dates and institutional 
holdings have a positive impact on PINs for targets. Firm size and R&D expense are 
identified as having a negative impact on PINs for targets. These findings prove that PIN 
partially reflects the activities of insiders and other informed investors about takeover 
intentions. 
There are many avenues for further research. Possibilities include an examination of: 
(1) the impact of good and bad PIN; (2) the behavior of PIN around pre-AD rumors for 
M&As; and (3) whether there is any PIN spill-over effect to other potential targets in the 




This appendix describes the quote conditions that are excluded from our data. The 
descriptions are drawn from the TAQ User’s Guide, New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 
Version 3.31. 
 Fast trading – where quotes are recorded on a best efforts basis during extremely 
active and short trading periods  
 Order imbalance – where the severe order imbalance is too severe that the trading 
is halted 
 Closed market maker 
 Non-firm quote – which happens for 30 minutes due to a regulatory halt 
 News pending – a regulatory halt or delayed opening due to expected 
dissemination of news that can affect the stock trading 
 Trading halt in view of common – a non-regulatory halt that prevents the matters 
that affect common stock and other securities of the same company 
 Order influx – a non-regulatory halt is made due to extremely large arrivals of buy 
or sell orders 
 No open/no resume – a trading halt or an opening delay for the entire trading day 
 Opening (Re-opening) price 
 Related security news dissemination – a regulatory halt that works in the similar 
fashion with trading halt in view of common, but for news that relate to one 
security that affect other securities 
 Related security news pending – a regulatory halt that works in the similar fashion 
with the above, but for expected news 
 Additional Information – a regulatory halt or delayed opening that is made upon a 
request of an exchange to disseminate more information about a security  
 Additional Information due to related security – a regulatory halt or delayed 
opening that is made upon a request of an exchange to disseminate more 
information about a security that affects the trading of related securities. 
 Resume – when halting or delayed opening is lifted for a security and its bid and 
offer sizes are assigned as zero 
 Related Security News pending – works in the same fashion as News Pending, but 
for expected news 
 Quotes with spread greater than 20% of the midquote (following Chordia, Roll, 





This appendix lists the means and medians of the probabilities of information-based trading (PIN) 
found in some selected studies over the whole sample or over windows that comprise the dates 
around announcement dates (ADs) and effective dates (EDs). 
Past research Sample Mean Median 
Easley et al. 
(2002) 
1,311 to 1,846 NYSE-listed stocks from 




54 high-volume and 54 low volume NYSE-
listed stocks for August 1997 
Volume group: 0.1106 for high; 




Easley, Hvidkjaer, & O’Hara (2002) sample 





1,043 representative NYSE-listed securities 
during the fourth quarter of 2002 from TAQ 
0.136 0.129 
Aktas et al. 
(2007) 
87 M&A announcements on Euronext Paris 
from 1995 to 2000 
0.1861 for [AD-180; AD-66]; 
0.1767 for [AD-65; AD-6]; 0.2029 
for [AD+3; AD+63] 
N/A 
Easley et al. 
(2008) 
NYSE-and AMEX-list stocks (35,722 firm-





representative NYSE- & AMEX-listed 





All U.S. Treasury bonds,  Jan. 1992 to 
December 2002 (notSept. 2001) from 
GovPX database 
0.2619 0.2652 
Easley, et al. 
(2010) 
1,826 NYSE-and AMEX-listed stocks 
(37,907 firm-years) from 1983 to 2001 
0.194 N/A 
Lin and Ke 
(2011) 
A sample of 1,056 representative NYSE-






Easley et al. (2010) sample for the period 







252 NASDAQ-listed targets & 111 NYSE-
listed targets, 277 NASDAQ-listed acquirers 
& 191 NYSE-listed acquirers during the year 
2001 
0.238 for pre-AD, NASDAQ-
targets; 
0.198 for AD, NASDAQ-targets; 
0.154 for pre-AD, NYSE-targets; 
0.189 for AD, NYSE-targets; 
0.161 for pre-AD, NASD-
acquirers; 
0.17 for AD, NASD-acquirers; 
0.135 for post-ED, NASD-
acquirers; 
0.181 for ED, NASD-acquirers; 
0.128 for pre-AD, NYSE-
acquirers; 
0.16 for AD,  NYSE -acquirers; 
0.131 for post-ED, NYSE -
acquirers; 





































Table 1: Summary statistics for the sample of acquirers and targets 
This table provides the summary statistics of the sample sets that consist of 57 biotech acquirers 
and 99 biotech targets from 2005 to 2011 whose primary exchanges are either the NYSE, 
NASDAQ, or AMEX. 
 NYSE NASDAQ AMEX TOTAL 
  ACQUIRERS   
2005 4 0 0 4 
2006 8 4 0 12 
2007 9 3 2 14 
2008 6 2 0 8 
2009 4 5 0 9 
2010 8 0 0 8 
2011 2 0 0 2 
TOTAL 41 14 2 57 
  TARGETS   
2005 0 4 0 4 
2006 0 6 0 6 
2007 2 16 0 18 
2008 3 17 0 20 
2009 1 21 0 22 
2010 1 16 1 18 
2011 1 10 0 11 




Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the PIN estimates using the Easley et al. method for acquirers 
 This table provides summary statistics for the PIN estimates using the Easley et al. method for the five acquisition windows for the sample 
of 57 acquirers. The labels descriptions are: W1_EHO: EHO PIN estimates for the 60 days pre-announcement or [AD-60: AD-2]; 
W2_13_EHO: EHO PIN estimates for the three days centered on the announcement date [AD-1: AD+1] when assigning 78 trading blocks 
into 13 samples; W2_26_EHO: EHO PIN estimates for the three days centered on the announcement date [AD-1: AD+1] when assigning 
78 trading blocks into 26 samples; W2_39_EHO: EHO PIN estimates for the three days centered on the announcement date [AD-1: AD+1] 
when assigning 78 trading blocks into 39 samples; W3_EHO: EHO PIN estimates for the period between AD and ED or [AD+2: ED-2]; 
W4_13_EHO: EHO PIN estimates for the three days centered on the effective date [ED-1: ED+1] when assigning 78 trading blocks into 13 
samples; W4_26_EHO: EHO PIN estimates for the three days centered on the effective date [ED-1: ED+1] when assigning 78 trading blocks 
into 26 samples; W4_39_EHO: EHO PIN estimates for the three days centered on the effective date [ED-1: ED+1] when assigning 78 
trading blocks into 39 samples; and W5_EHO: EHO PIN estimates for the 60 days after the ED or [ED+2: ED+60], and AD and ED are the 
announcement and effective dates, respectively. 
  W1_EHO W2_13_EHO W2_26_EHO W2_39_EHO W3_EHO W4_13_EHO W4_26_EHO W4_39_EHO W5_EHO 
Mean 0.138 0.128 0.148 0.17 0.12 0.136 0.167 0.192 0.121 
Standard 
Error 
0.011 0.009 0.008 0.01 0.009 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.009 
Median 0.116 0.106 0.131 0.148 0.104 0.117 0.142 0.158 0.102 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.085 0.07 0.061 0.078 0.07 0.096 0.102 0.107 0.065 
Sample 
Variance 
0.007 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.009 0.01 0.011 0.004 
Kurtosis 0.029 8.722 1.744 3.943 1.846 17.399 12.151 11.879 1.443 
Skewness 0.994 2.292 1.225 1.68 1.237 3.512 2.887 2.811 1.103 
Range 0.333 0.448 0.298 0.436 0.326 0.626 0.628 0.657 0.321 
Minimum 0 0.019 0.066 0.046 0 0.048 0.066 0.09 0.001 
Maximum 0.333 0.467 0.364 0.482 0.326 0.675 0.694 0.747 0.322 
Sum 7.86 7.294 8.426 9.694 6.832 7.727 9.544 10.963 6.9 
Count 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 
Confidence 
Level (95%) 
0.023 0.019 0.016 0.021 0.018 0.025 0.027 0.028 0.017 
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Table 3: Tests of differences in EHO PIN estimates for acquirers between the five acquisition windows 
This table provides the results of the Wilcoxon signed ranks tests for the differences of the means of the EHO PIN estimates with their p-
values reported in the parentheses. This is followed the medians of the EHO PIN estimates with their respective Z-values reported in the 
parentheses within the square brackets for the pairs of the five acquisition windows for acquirers. The label descriptions are: W1_EHO: 
EHO PIN estimates for the 60 days pre-announcement or [AD-60: AD-2]; W2_13_EHO: EHO PIN estimates for the three days centered on 
the announcement date [AD-1: AD+1] when assigning 78 trading blocks into 13 samples; W2_26_EHO: EHO PIN estimates for the three 
days centered on the announcement date [AD-1: AD+1] when assigning 78 trading blocks into 26 samples; W2_39_EHO: EHO PIN 
estimates for the three days centered on the announcement date [AD-1: AD+1] when assigning 78 trading blocks into 39 samples; W3_EHO: 
EHO PIN estimates for the period between AD and ED or [AD+2: ED-2]; W4_13_EHO: EHO PIN estimates for the three days centered on 
the effective date [ED-1: ED+1] when assigning 78 trading blocks into 13 samples; W4_26_EHO: EHO PIN estimates for the three days 
centered on the effective date [ED-1: ED+1] when assigning 78 trading blocks into 26 samples; W4_39_EHO: EHO PIN estimates for the 
three days centered on the effective date [ED-1: ED+1] when assigning 78 trading blocks into 39 samples; and W5_EHO: EHO PIN estimates 
for the 60 days after the ED or [ED+2: ED+60], and AD and ED are the announcement and effective dates, respectively. The Wilcoxon 
signed rank test is performed for the mean difference between the values on the column and the rows. ***, **, * correspond to significance 
levels of 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. 
Acquirers W1_EHO W2_39_EHO W3_EHO W4_39_EHO W5_EHO 































Table 4: Descriptive statistics for the PIN estimates using the Easley et al. method for targets 
This table provides summary statistics for the PIN estimates using the Easley et al. method for the five acquisition windows for the sample 
of 99 targets. The label description are: W1_EHO: EHO PIN estimates for the 60 days pre-announcement or [AD-60: AD-2]; W2_13_EHO: 
EHO PIN estimates for the three days centered on the announcement date [AD-1: AD+1] when assigning 78 trading blocks into 13 samples; 
W2_26_EHO: EHO PIN estimates for the three days centered on the announcement date [AD-1: AD+1] when assigning 78 trading blocks 
into 26 samples; W2_39_EHO: EHO PIN estimates for the three days centered on the announcement date [AD-1: AD+1] when assigning 
78 trading blocks into 39 samples; and W3_EHO: EHO PIN estimates for the period between AD and ED or [AD+2: ED-2], and AD and 
ED are the announcement and effective dates, respectively. 
 
Targets W1_EHO W2_13_EHO   W2_26_EHO   W2_39_EHO   W3_EHO   
Mean 0.202 0.285 0.315 0.366 0.280 
Standard Error 0.009 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.012 
Median 0.179 0.252 0.287 0.335 0.268 
Standard Deviation 0.092 0.150 0.148 0.154 0.118 
Sample Variance 0.009 0.022 0.022 0.024 0.014 
Kurtosis 1.641 2.000 1.800 0.478 2.187 
Skewness 1.099 1.336 1.068 0.833 1.168 
Range 0.524 0.745 0.883 0.728 0.696 
Minimum 0.004 0.088 0.001 0.124 0.015 
Maximum 0.528 0.833 0.884 0.852 0.712 
Sum 19.996 28.260 31.208 36.192 27.695 
Confidence Level (95%) 0.018 0.030 0.030 0.031 0.024 
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Table 5: Tests of differences in EHO PIN estimates for targets between the three acquisition windows 
This table provides the results of the Wilcoxon signed ranks tests for the differences of the means of the EHO PIN estimates with their p-
values reported in the parentheses. This is followed by the medians of the EHO PIN estimates with their respective Z-values reported in the 
parentheses within the square brackets for the pairs of the three acquisition windows for targets. The label descriptions are: W1_EHO: EHO 
PIN estimates for the 60 days pre-announcement or [AD-60: AD-2]; W2_39_EHO: EHO PIN estimates for the three days centered on the 
announcement date [AD-1: AD+1] when assigning 78 trading blocks into 39 samples; and W3_EHO: EHO PIN estimates for the period 
between AD and ED or [AD+2: ED-2], and AD and ED are the announcement and effective dates, respectively. The Wilcoxon signed rank 
test is performed for the mean difference between the values on the column and the rows. ***, **, * correspond to significance levels of 1, 
5, and 10%, respectively 
 
Targets  W1 _EHO W2_39 _EHO W3 _EHO 
W1 _EHO 1     
W2_39 
_EHO 
 -11.094*** (Pr > |t|=<.0001) 
[-8.194***( Pr > |Z|=<.0001)] 
1   
W3 _EHO 
 -6.242*** (Pr > |t| <.0001) 
[-5.485***( Pr > |Z|=<.0001)] 
 5.627***(Pr > |t|<.0001) 





Table 6: Descriptive statistics for the PIN estimates using the Yan and Zhang method for acquirers 
This table provides summary statistics for the PIN estimates using the Yan and Zhang method for the five acquisition windows for the 
sample of 57 acquirers. The label description are: W1_YZ: YZ PIN estimates for the 60 days pre-announcement or [AD-60: AD-2]; 
W2_39_YZ: YZ PIN estimates for the three days centered on the announcement date [AD-1: AD+1] when assigning 78 trading blocks into 
39 samples; W3_YZ: YZ PIN estimates for the period between AD and ED or [AD+2: ED-2]; W4_39_YZ: YZ PIN estimates for the three 
days centered on the effective date [ED-1: ED+1] when assigning 78 trading blocks into 39 samples; and W5_YZ: YZ PIN estimates for the 
60 days after the ED or [ED+2: ED+60], and AD and ED are the announcement and effective dates, respectively. 
 
  W1_YZ W2_39_YZ W3_YZ P4_39_YZ W5_YZ 
Mean 0.141 0.252 0.141 0.251 0.147 
Standard Error 0.013 0.009 0.015 0.01 0.015 
Median 0.113 0.243 0.107 0.239 0.119 
Standard Deviation 0.098 0.064 0.11 0.072 0.111 
Sample Variance 0.01 0.004 0.012 0.005 0.012 
Kurtosis 6.42 4.07 5.446 1.433 5.892 
Skewness 2.517 1.35 2.419 0.997 2.475 
Range 0.478 0.359 0.47 0.357 0.523 
Minimum 0.048 0.163 0.038 0.135 0.023 
Maximum 0.526 0.522 0.508 0.493 0.545 
Sum 8.063 14.352 8.042 14.286 8.376 




Table 7: Tests of differences in YZ PIN estimates for acquirers between the five acquisition windows 
This table provides the results of the Wilcoxon signed ranks tests for the differences of the means of the YZ PIN estimates with their p-
values reported in the parentheses. This is followed by the medians of the YZ PIN estimates with their respective Z-values reported in the 
parentheses within the square brackets for the pairs of the five acquisition windows for acquirers. The label descriptions are: W1_YZ: YZ 
PIN estimates for the 60 days pre-announcement or [AD-60: AD-2]; W2_39_YZ: YZ PIN estimates for the three days centered on the 
announcement date [AD-1: AD+1] when assigning 78 trading blocks into 39 samples; W3_YZ: YZ PIN estimates for the period between 
AD and ED or [AD+2: ED-2]; W4_39_YZ: YZ PIN estimates for the three days centered on the effective date [ED-1: ED+1] when assigning 
78 trading blocks into 39 samples; and W5_YZ: YZ PIN estimates for the 60 days after the ED or [ED+2: ED+60], and AD and ED are the 
announcement and effective dates, respectively. The Wilcoxon signed rank test is performed for the mean difference between the values on 
the column and the rows. ***, **, * correspond to significance levels of 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. 
Acquirers W1_YZ W2_39_YZ W3_YZ W4_39_YZ W5_YZ 
































Table 8: Descriptive statistics for the PIN estimates using the Yan and Zhang method for targets 
This table provides summary statistics for the PIN estimates using the Yan and Zhang method for the five acquisition windows for the 
sample of 99 targets. The label description are: W1_YZ: YZ PIN estimates for the 60 days pre-announcement or [AD-60: AD-2]; 
W2_39_YZ: YZ PIN estimates for the three days centered on the announcement date [AD-1: AD+1] when assigning 78 trading blocks into 
39 samples; and W3_YZ: YZ PIN estimates for the period between AD and ED or [AD+2: ED-2], and AD and ED are the announcement 
and effective dates, respectively. 
 
 W1_YZ W2_39_YZ W3_YZ 
Mean 0.206 0.372 0.269 
Standard Error 0.011 0.011 0.010 
Median 0.178 0.356 0.253 
Standard Deviation 0.105 0.106 0.098 
Sample Variance 0.011 0.011 0.010 
Kurtosis 0.662 -0.328 2.473 
Skewness 1.173 0.352 1.366 
Range 0.413 0.537 0.531 
Minimum 0.064 0.136 0.119 
Maximum 0.477 0.673 0.650 
Sum 20.413 36.819 26.626 




Table 9: Tests of differences in YZ PIN estimates for targets between the three acquisition windows 
This table provides the results of the Wilcoxon signed ranks tests for the differences of the means of the YZ PIN estimates with their p-
values reported in the parentheses. This is followed by the medians of the YZ PIN estimates with their respective Z-values reported in the 
parentheses within the square brackets for the pairs of the three acquisition windows for targets. The label descriptions are: W1_YZ: YZ 
PIN estimates for the 60 days pre-announcement or [AD-60: AD-2]; W2_39_YZ: YZ PIN estimates for the three days centered on the 
announcement date [AD-1: AD+1] when assigning 78 trading blocks into 39 samples; and W3_YZ: YZ PIN estimates for the period between 
AD and ED or [AD+2: ED-2], and AD and ED are the announcement and effective dates, respectively. The Wilcoxon signed rank test is 
performed for the mean difference between the values on the column and the rows. ***, **, * correspond to significance levels of 1, 5, and 
10%, respectively. 
 
 Targets  W1_YZ W2_39_YZ W3_YZ 




1    
W3_YZ 
 -4.935***( <.0001) 
[-5.276***(<.0001)] 






Table 10: Tests of differences in EHO PIN estimates between acquirers and targets for the three acquisition windows 
This table provides the results of the Wilcoxon signed ranks tests for the differences of the means of the EHO PIN estimates with their p-
values reported in the parentheses. This is followed by the medians of the EHO PIN estimates with their respective Z-values reported in the 
parentheses within the square brackets for the pairs of the three acquisition windows for acquirers and targets. The label descriptions are: 
W1_EHO: EHO PIN estimates for the 60 days pre-announcement or [AD-60: AD-2]; W2_39_EHO: EHO PIN estimates for the three days 
centered on the announcement date [AD-1: AD+1] when assigning 78 trading blocks into 39 samples; W3_EHO: EHO PIN estimates for 
the period between AD and ED or [AD+2: ED-2], and AD and ED are the announcement and effective dates, respectively. The Wilcoxon 
signed rank test is performed for the mean difference between the values on the column and the rows. ***, **, * correspond to significance 
levels of 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. 
 























Table 11: Tests of differences in YZ PIN estimates between acquirers and targets for the three acquisition windows 
This table provides the results of the Wilcoxon signed ranks tests for the differences of the means of the YZ PIN estimates with their p-
values reported in the parentheses. This is followed by the medians of the YZ PIN estimates with their respective Z-values reported in the 
parentheses within the square brackets for the pairs of the three acquisition windows for acquirers and acquirers. The label descriptions are: 
W1_YZ: YZ PIN estimates for the 60 days pre-announcement or [AD-60: AD-2]; W2_39_YZ: YZ PIN estimates for the three days centered 
on the announcement date [AD-1: AD+1] when assigning 78 trading blocks into 39 samples; W3_YZ: YZ PIN estimates for the period 
between AD and ED or [AD+2: ED-2], and AD and ED are the announcement and effective dates, respectively. The Wilcoxon signed rank 
test is performed for the mean difference between the values on the column and the rows. ***, **, * correspond to significance levels of 1, 
5, and 10%, respectively. 
 























Table 12: Tests of differences between the EHO PIN estimates and YZ PIN estimates for acquirers 
This table provides the results of the Wilcoxon signed ranks tests for the differences of the means of the EHO and YZ PIN estimates with 
their p-values reported in the parentheses. This is followed by the medians of the EHO and YZ PIN estimates with their respective Z-values 
reported in the parentheses within the square brackets for the pairs of EHO and YZ PIN estimates for the five acquisition windows for 
acquirers. The label descriptions are: W1_YZ: YZ PIN estimates for the 60 days pre-announcement or [AD-60: AD-2]; W2_39_YZ: YZ 
PIN estimates for the three days centered on the announcement date [AD-1: AD+1] when assigning 78 trading blocks into 39 samples; 
W3_YZ: YZ PIN estimates for the period between AD and ED or [AD+2: ED-2]; W4_39_YZ: YZ PIN estimates for the three days centered 
on the effective date [ED-1: ED+1] when assigning 78 trading blocks into 39 samples; W5_YZ: YZ PIN estimates for the 60 days after the 
ED or [ED+2: ED+60]; W1_EHO: EHO PIN estimates for the 60 days pre-announcement or [AD-60: AD-2]; W2_39_EHO: EHO PIN 
estimates for the three days centered on the announcement date [AD-1: AD+1] when assigning 78 trading blocks into 39 samples; W3_EHO: 
EHO PIN estimates for the period between AD and ED or [AD+2: ED-2]; W4_39_EHO: EHO PIN estimates for the three days centered on 
the effective date [ED-1: ED+1] when assigning 78 trading blocks into 39 samples; and W5_EHO: EHO PIN estimates for the 60 days after 
the ED or [ED+2: ED+60], and AD and ED are the announcement and effective dates, respectively. The Wilcoxon signed rank test is 
performed for the mean difference between the values on the column and the rows. ***, **, * correspond to significance levels of 1, 5, and 
10%, respectively. 
Acquirers W1_YZ W2_39_YZ W3_YZ  W4_39_YZ  W5_YZ  
W1_EHO 
 0.269 (0.789) 
[0.159 (0.8739)] 
        
W2_39_EHO   
 10.274***( <.0001) 
[6.189***(<.0001)] 
      
W3_EHO     
 1.384 (0.1718) 
[0.43 (0.6667)] 
    




W5_EHO         




Table 13: Tests of differences between the EHO PIN estimates and YZ PIN estimates for targets 
This table provides the results of the Wilcoxon signed ranks tests for the differences of the means of the EHO and YZ PIN estimates with 
their p-values reported in the parentheses. This is followed by the medians of the EHO and YZ PIN estimates with their respective Z-
values reported in the parentheses within the square brackets for the pairs of EHO and YZ PIN estimates for the three acquisition windows 
for targets. The label descriptions are: W1_YZ: YZ PIN estimates for the 60 days pre-announcement or [AD-60: AD-2]; W2_39_YZ: YZ 
PIN estimates for the three days centered on the announcement date [AD-1: AD+1] when assigning 78 trading blocks into 39 samples; 
W3_YZ: YZ PIN estimates for the period between AD and ED or [AD+2: ED-2]; W1_EHO: EHO PIN estimates for the 60 days pre-
announcement or [AD-60: AD-2]; W2_39_EHO: EHO PIN estimates for the three days centered on the announcement date [AD-1: 
AD+1] when assigning 78 trading blocks into 39 samples; W3_EHO: EHO PIN estimates for the period between AD and ED or [AD+2: 
ED-2], and AD and ED are the announcement and effective dates, respectively. The Wilcoxon signed rank test is performed for the mean 
difference between the values on the column and the rows. ***, **, * correspond to significance levels of 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Targets W1_YZ   W2_39_YZ  W3_YZ  
W1_EHO 
 0.59 (0.5566) 
[-0.233 (0.8156)] 
    
W2_39_EHO   
 0.526 (0.6003) 
 [1.081 (0.2795)] 
  
W3_EHO     






Table 14: Tests of differences in EHO PIN estimates for acquirers between the 13, 26, and 39 samples for the second 
window 
This table provides the results of the Wilcoxon signed ranks tests for the differences of the means of the EHO PIN estimates based on the 
three sample sizes with their p-values reported in the parentheses. This is followed by the medians of the EHO PIN estimates based on the 
three sample sizes with their respective Z-values reported in the parentheses within the square brackets for the pairs of the five acquisition 
windows for acquirers. The label descriptions are: W2_13_EHO: EHO PIN estimates for the three days centered on the announcement date 
[AD-1: AD+1] when assigning 78 trading blocks into 13 samples; W2_26_EHO: EHO PIN estimates for the three days centered on the 
announcement date [AD-1: AD+1] when assigning 78 trading blocks into 26 samples; and W2_39_EHO: EHO PIN estimates for the three 
days centered on the announcement date [AD-1: AD+1] when assigning 78 trading blocks into 39 samples, and AD and ED are the 
announcement and effective dates, respectively. The Wilcoxon signed rank test is performed for the mean difference between the values on 
the column and the rows. ***, **, * correspond to significance levels of 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Acquirers  W2_13_EHO W2_26_EHO W2_39_EHO 














Table 15: Tests of differences in EHO PIN estimates for acquirers between the 13, 26, and 39 samples for the fourth 
window 
This table provides the results of the Wilcoxon signed ranks tests for the differences of the means of the EHO PIN estimates based on the 
three sample sizes with their p-values reported in the parentheses. This is followed by the medians of the EHO PIN estimates based on the 
three sample sizes with their respective Z-values reported in the parentheses within the square brackets for the pairs of the fourth windows 
(ED) for acquirers. The label descriptions are: W4_13_EHO: EHO PIN estimates for the three days centered on the announcement date [ED-
1: ED+1] when assigning 78 trading blocks into 13 samples; W4_26_EHO: EHO PIN estimates for the three days centered on the 
announcement date [ED-1: ED+1] when assigning 78 trading blocks into 26 samples; and W4_39_EHO: EHO PIN estimates for the three 
days centered on the announcement date [ED-1: ED+1] when assigning 78 trading blocks into 39 samples, and AD and ED are the 
announcement and effective dates, respectively. The Wilcoxon signed rank test is performed for the mean difference between the values on 
the column and the rows. ***, **, * correspond to significance levels of 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Acquirers  W4_13_EHO W4_26_EHO W4_39_EHO 




[-2.7***(0.0069)] 1  
 
W4_39_EHO 









Table 16: Tests of differences in EHO PIN estimates for targets between the 13, 26, and 39 samples for the second 
window 
This table provides the results of the Wilcoxon signed ranks tests for the differences of the means of the EHO PIN estimates based on pairs 
of the three sample sizes with their p-values reported in the parentheses. This is followed by the medians of the EHO PIN estimates based 
on the three sample sizes with their respective Z-values reported in the parentheses within the square brackets for the pairs of the five 
acquisition windows for acquirers. The label descriptions are: W2_13_EHO: EHO PIN estimates for the three days centered on the 
announcement date [AD-1: AD+1] when assigning 78 trading blocks into 13 samples; W2_26_EHO: EHO PIN estimates for the three days 
centered on the announcement date [AD-1: AD+1] when assigning 78 trading blocks into 26 samples; and W2_39_EHO: EHO PIN estimates 
for the three days centered on the announcement date [AD-1: AD+1] when assigning 78 trading blocks into 39 samples, and AD and ED are 
the announcement and effective dates, respectively. The Wilcoxon signed rank test is performed for the mean difference between the values 
on the column and the rows. ***, **, * correspond to significance levels of 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Targets W2_13 _EHO W2_26 _EHO W2_39 _EHO 
















Table 17: Pre-bid acquisition gains for acquirer and target U.S. biotech firms from 2005 to 2011 
Panel A (B) in this table presents the one sample t-test (sign and signed rank tests) for the means (medians) of the CARs of acquirer and 
target firms, which are calculated by applying the Carhart four factors model (1997) and using equal and value-weighted market factors, 
over the [AD-60, AD-2] and [AD-1, AD+1] windows. The label descriptions are: pre60E is the CARs over the 60 days before ADs using 
the equal-weighted index, pre1E is the CARs over the 3 days around ADs using the equal-weighted index, pre60M is the CARs over the 60 
days before ADs using the value-weighted index, pre1M is the CARs over the 3 days around ADs using the value-weighted index. 
  Acquirers Targets 
Panel A: One sample t-test for means of CARs 
  pre60E pre1E pre60M pre1M pre60E pre1E pre60M pre1M 
Mean -0.0544 -0.0108 -0.0539 -0.00962 0.1333 0.5267 0.1356 0.5303 
Degree of freedom 53 53 53 53 94 94 94 94 
t-value -1.58 -1.48 -1.73 -1.4 2.31 8.03 2.51 8.08 
Pr>/t/ 0.1191 0.1439 0.09 0.1683 0.023 <.0001 0.0139 <.0001 
Panel B: One sample sign  and signed rank test for medians of CARs 
  pre60E pre1E pre60M pre1M pre60E pre1E pre60M pre1M 
Median 0.01225 0.00285 -0.033 0.00175 12.62 34.95 13.54 34.52 
Degree of freedom 53 53 53 53 94 94 94 94 
Sign test 1 1 -5 1 17.5 43.5 15.5 43.5 
Pr>/M/ 0.8919 0.8919 0.2203 0.8919 0.0004 <.0001 0.0019 <.0001 
Signed rank test -130.5 -58.5 -187.5 -32 896.5 2236.5 865 2243 




Table 18: Changes in pre-bid acquisition gains from the 60 days before ADs to 3 days around ADs periods for acquirer 
and target U.S. biotech firms from 2005 to 2011 
Panel A (B) in this table presents the Wilcoxon sign ranked sum test for the changes of the means and medians of the CARs of acquirer and 
target firms, which are calculated by applying the Carhart four factors model (1997) and using equal and value-weighted market factors 
from the [AD-60, AD-2] to [AD-1, AD+1] windows. The label descriptions are: pre60E is the CARs over the 60 days before ADs using the 
equal-weighted index, pre1E is the CARs over the 3 days around ADs using the equal-weighted index, pre60M is the CARs over the 60 
days before ADs using the value-weighted index, pre1M is the CARs over the 3 days around ADs using the value-weighted index. 
  Acquirers Targets 
Panel A: Paired t-test for the means of the pairs pre60E and pre1E and pre60M and pre1M 
  pre60E - pre1E pre60M - pre1M pre60E - pre1E pre60M - pre1M 
Mean -0.04366 -0.0442352 -0.39337 -0.39473 
Degree of freedom 53 53 94 94 
t-value -1.19464 -1.3183 -4.35152 -4.4477 
Pr>/t/ 0.2375 0.1931 <.0001 <.0001 
Panel B: Paired sign and signed rank tests for the medians of the pairs pre60E and pre1E and pre60M and pre1M 
Median 0.00295 -0.0295 -0.2723 -0.2424 
Degree of freedom 53 53 94 94 
Sign test 1 -4 -20.5 -20.5 
Pr>/M/ 0.8919 0.3409 <.0001 <.0001 
Signed rank test -92.5 -160.5 -1318 -1315 




Table 19: Regression of the mean CARs for the [AD-1, AD+1] window on the firm characteristics for acquirers 
Panels A and B of this table report coefficient estimates from regressions of CARs means for the [AD-1, AD+1] window using equal and 
market value indexes, respectively, against various firm characteristics for 54 acquirers. The independent variables are described as follows. 
BTM is the ratio of total book value to market value in millions of dollars for the fiscal year end before the ADs. DTE is debt-to-equity ratio 
or the ratio of total liabilities to total equity of shareholders, which is a proxy for a firm’s financial risk, measured at the fiscal year end 
before the ADs. IH is the natural logarithm of one plus the ratio of shares owned by institutional investors to total common shares traded for 
the fiscal year ended before the ADs. ISHD is the natural logarithm of one plus the ratio of stock that is held directly by insiders to total 
shares traded for the fiscal year end before the ADs. LnRD is the natural logarithm of total R&D expense in millions of dollars for the fiscal 
year end before the ADs. Size(LnTA) is the natural logarithm of total assets in millions of dollars, which is a proxy for a firm’s size, measured 











t Value Pr > |t| Tolerance 
Variance 
Inflation 
Panel A: Mean CARs for [AD-1, AD+1] based on equally weighted market index 
Intercept 1 -0.2738 0.10438 -2.62 0.0117 . 0 
BTM 1 0.033 0.03638 0.91 0.369 0.74687 1.33892 
DTE 1 -0.00991 0.00877 -1.13 0.2638 0.50971 1.96189 
SizeLnTA 1 0.01351 0.00544 2.48** 0.0167 0.39217 2.54994 
LnRD 1 -0.00241 0.00203 -1.19 0.2419 0.49631 2.01486 
ISHD 1 0.15607 0.25785 0.61 0.5479 0.57262 1.74637 
IH 1 -9.58062 40.30022 -0.24 0.8131 0.55115 1.81438 
R-Square = 0.16, Adjusted R-Square = 0.0528,  Root MSE = 0.05195 
Panel B: Mean CARs for [AD-1, AD+1] based on value weighted market index 
Intercept 1 -0.25777 0.0983 -2.62 0.0117 . 0 
BTM 1 0.03558 0.03426 1.04 0.3043 0.74687 1.33892 
DTE 1 -0.0091 0.00825 -1.1 0.2759 0.50971 1.96189 
SizeLnTA 1 0.01282 0.00512 2.50** 0.0159 0.39217 2.54994 
LnRD 1 -0.00247 0.00191 -1.29 0.2037 0.49631 2.01486 
ISHD 1 0.14072 0.24284 0.58 0.565 0.57262 1.74637 
IH 1 -8.81211 37.95317 -0.23 0.8174 0.55115 1.81438 
R-Square = 0.1712, Adjusted R-Square = 0.0654, Root MSE = 0.04893 
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Table 20: Regression of means CARs over the [AD-1, AD+1] window on firm characteristics for targets 
Panels A and B of this table report coefficient estimates from regressions of CARs means for the [AD-1, AD+1] window using equal and 
market value indexes, respectively, against various firm characteristics for 95 targets. The independent variables are described as follows. 
BTM is the ratio of total book value to market value in million dollars for the fiscal year end before the ADs. DTE is debt-to-equity ratio or 
the ratio of total liabilities to total equity of shareholders, which is a proxy for a firm’s financial risk, measured at the fiscal year end before 
the ADs. IH is the natural logarithm of one plus the ratio of shares owned by institutional investors to total common shares traded for the 
fiscal year ended before the ADs. ISHD is the natural logarithm of one plus the ratio of stock that is held directly by insiders to total shares 
traded for the fiscal year end before ADs. LnRD is the natural logarithm of total R&D expense in millions of dollars for the fiscal year end 
before the ADs. Size(LnTA) is the natural logarithm of total assets in millions of dollars, which is a proxy for a firm’s size, measured at the 









t Value Pr > |t| Tolerance 
Variance 
Inflation 
Panel A: Mean CARs for [AD-1, AD+1] based on equally weighted market index 
Intercept 1 3.07093 1.01623 3.02 0.0033 . 0 
BTM 1 0.23565 0.12294 1.92* 0.0585 0.83344 1.19984 
DTE 1 -0.00619 0.00713 -0.87 0.3880 0.95829 1.04352 
SizeLnTA 1 -0.14937 0.05904 -2.53** 0.0132 0.49182 2.03324 
ISHD 1 -0.03347 0.69096 -0.05 0.9615 0.93707 1.06715 
IH 1 0.04042 0.25524 0.16 0.8745 0.91521 1.09265 
lnRD 1 0.06760 0.05808 1.16 0.2476 0.48035 2.08183 
R-Square = 0.1021, Adjusted R-Square = 0.0409. Root MSE = 0.6261276  
Panel B: Mean CARs for [AD-1, AD+1] based on value weighted market index 
Intercept 1 3.10530 1.01674 3.05 0.0030 . 0 
BTM 1 0.23242 0.12300 1.89* 0.0621 0.83344 1.19984 
DTE 1 -0.00619 0.00714 -0.87 0.3878 0.95829 1.04352 
SizeLnTA 1 -0.15077 0.05907 -2.55** 0.0124 0.49182 2.03324 
ISHD 1 -0.04114 0.69131 -0.06 0.9527 0.93707 1.06715 
IH 1 0.03409 0.25537 0.13 0.8941 0.91521 1.09265 
lnRD 1 0.06765 0.05810 1.16 0.2474 0.48035 2.08183 
R-Square = 0.1024, Adjusted R-Square = 0.0412, Root MSE = 0.62645 
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Table 21: Cross-sectional regression results for firm characteristics variables on the YZ PINs and EMO PINs around 
ADs for acquirers 
Panels A and B of this table report coefficient estimates from regressions of YZ PINs and EMO PINs, respectively, for the [AD-1, AD+1] window 
using equal and market value indexes, respectively, against various firm characteristics for 54 acquirers. The independent variables are described 
as follows. BTM is the ratio of total book value to market value in million dollars for the fiscal year end before the ADs. DTE is debt-to-equity 
ratio or the ratio of total liabilities to total equity of shareholders, which is a proxy for a firm’s financial risk, measured at the fiscal year end before 
the ADs. IH is the natural logarithm of one plus the ratio of shares owned by institutional investors to total common shares traded for the fiscal 
year ended before the ADs. ISHD is the natural logarithm of one plus the ratio of stock that is held directly by insiders to total shares traded for the 
fiscal year end before ADs. LnRD is the natural logarithm of total R&D expense in millions of dollars for the fiscal year end before the ADs. 
Size(LnTA) is the natural logarithm of total assets in millions of dollars, which is a proxy for a firm’s size, measured at the fiscal year end before 
the ADs. ***, **, * correspond to significance levels of 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. 
 








t Value Pr > |t| Tolerance 
Variance 
Inflation 
Intercept 1 0.39507 0.10709 3.69 0.0006 . 0 
BTM 1 0.09074 0.03733 2.43** 0.0189 0.74687 1.33892 
DTE 1 0.01585 0.00899 1.76* 0.0844 0.50971 1.96189 
SizeLnTA 1 -0.00798 0.00558 -1.43 0.1595 0.39217 2.54994 
LnRD 1 -0.0005787 0.00209 -0.28 0.7827 0.49631 2.01486 
ISHD 1 0.59473 0.26454 2.25** 0.0293 0.57262 1.74637 
IH 1 -20.62036 41.34554 -0.5 0.6203 0.55115 1.81438 
R-Square = 0.3871, Adjusted R-Square = 0.3089, Root MSE = 0.0533 
Panel B: The dependent variable is EMO PINs around the [AD-1, AD+1] window 
Intercept 1 0.36219 0.11867 3.05 0.0037 . 0 
BTM 1 0.12596 0.04137 3.05*** 0.0038 0.74687 1.33892 
DTE 1 0.01436 0.00997 1.44 0.1561 0.50971 1.96189 
SizeLnTA 1 -0.01026 0.00619 -1.66 0.1039 0.39217 2.54994 
LnRD 1 0.0001657 0.00231 0.07 0.9432 0.49631 2.01486 
ISHD 1 0.75657 0.29316 2.58** 0.013 0.57262 1.74637 
IH 1 -66.42475 45.8193 -1.45 0.1538 0.55115 1.81438 
R-Square = 0.4248, Adjusted R-Square = 0.3514, Root MSE = 0.05907 
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Table 22: Cross-sectional regression results for firm characteristics variables on the YZ PINs and EMO PINs around 
ADs for targets 
Panels A and B of this table report coefficient estimates from regressions of YZ PINs and EMO PINs, respectively, for the [AD-1, AD+1] window 
using equal and market value indexes, respectively, against various firm characteristics for 95 targets. The independent variables are described as 
follows. BTM is the ratio of total book value to market value in million dollars for the fiscal year end before the ADs. DTE is debt-to-equity ratio 
or the ratio of total liabilities to total equity of shareholders, which is a proxy for a firm’s financial risk, measured at the fiscal year end before the 
ADs. IH is the natural logarithm of one plus the ratio of shares owned by institutional investors to total common shares traded for the fiscal year 
ended before the ADs. ISHD is the natural logarithm of one plus the ratio of stock that is held directly by insiders to total shares traded for the 
fiscal year end before ADs. LnRD is the natural logarithm of total R&D expense in millions of dollars for the fiscal year end before the ADs. 
Size(LnTA) is the natural logarithm of total assets in millions of dollars, which is a proxy for a firm’s size, measured at the fiscal year end before 
the ADs. ***, **, * correspond to significance levels of 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. 
 










Intercept 1 0.7921 0.14725 5.38 <.0001 . 0 
BTM 1 -0.00287 0.01781 -0.16 0.8725 0.83344 1.19984 
DTE 1 -0.0008573 0.00103 -0.83 0.409 0.95829 1.04352 
SizeLnTA 1 -0.02055 0.00855 -2.40** 0.0184 0.49182 2.03324 
lnRD 1 -0.0169 0.00842 -2.01** 0.0477 0.48035 2.08183 
ISHD 1 0.03706 0.10012 0.37 0.7122 0.93707 1.06715 
IH 1 0.06811 0.03698 1.84* 0.0689 0.91521 1.09265 
R-Square = 0.3154, Adjusted R-Square = 0.2687, Root MSE = 0.09072 
Panel B: The dependent variable is EMO PINs around the [AD-1, AD+1] window 
Intercept 1 1.23992 0.19526 6.35 <.0001 . 0 
BTM 1 0.01837 0.02362 0.78 0.4388 0.83344 1.19984 
DTE 1 -0.0008047 0.00137 -0.59 0.5586 0.95829 1.04352 
SizeLnTA 1 -0.04507 0.01134 -3.97*** 0.0001 0.49182 2.03324 
lnRD 1 -0.01837 0.01116 -1.65 0.1033 0.48035 2.08183 
ISHD 1 0.08089 0.13277 0.61 0.5439 0.93707 1.06715 
IH 1 0.09639 0.04904 1.97* 0.0525 0.91521 1.09265 
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